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ABSTRACT 
 
This study expands on previous work done on signaling/screening take-it-or-leave-it asymmetric 
information games, where excess disputes occur. Two players engage in an embedded ultimatum 
game in a stylized legal framework of plaintiff versus defendant. The plaintiff has either a low or 
a high claim on the uninformed defendant. There is a computerized version of the embedded 
ultimatum game to test replicability of literature results. Two novel variations are introduced. In 
the first variation, multiple sequential offers can be made by the proposer during a single period 
of the embedded game, and in the second, real time offers and counteroffers can be made by both 
the plaintiff and the defendant. The effect of adding those negotiation mechanisms is studied. 
Overall, replication results are consistent with theory. Subjects make use of the multiple offer 
mechanism. Multiple offers facilitate higher rates of settlement, especially in high claim 
plaintiffs. When a high claim case settles, the defendant earns most of the gains from settlement. 
The bilateral multiple offer mechanism increases settlement between bluffing low claim plaintiff 
and defendant by giving the plaintiff an opportunity to accept the defendant’s offer.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The ultimatum game is relevant to real-world bargaining between parties engaged in a 
negotiation, especially under conditions of asymmetric information. One can find such a game 
embedded in a civil litigation process. In that situation, one party (the plaintiff) has a claim on 
the other (the defendant). If they cannot reach settlement, the dispute is resolved by a neutral 
third party (e.g., a judge). The plaintiff has an amount of damages that can vary in size. Consider 
the simple case where there are two possible damages, one where the plaintiff has a high claim, 
and one where she has a low claim. Nature decides the size of the claim. The informed plaintiff 
knows the size of the claim. The uninformed defendant only knows the probability distribution 
over the possible claim sizes. Litigation is costly to both plaintiff and defendant as each incur 
legal fees if the case goes to trial. The plaintiff is assured to receive her type-specific damages if 
the dispute goes on trial, minus the legal fee she incurs. At trial, the defendant incurs a cost equal 
to the plaintiff’s damages plus the legal fee he incurs. As a result, the plaintiff and defendant can 
generate surplus by settling the dispute before it reaches the judge. The amount of surplus is 
equal to the sum of avoidable litigation costs. Negotiating a pre-trial settlement would distribute 
the surplus between the two. When one party has the power to make a single take-it-or-leave-it 
pre-trial offer, the two parties play an ultimatum game over this amount of money, that is, there 
is an ultimatum game embedded within the legal bargaining context. If they reach an agreement, 
they split the surplus according to the offer made; if they do not, they go to trial and incur the 
judgement and fees as described. 
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1.1. Background 
The strategies, incentives, and empirical findings in a simple ultimatum game are relevant 
to this embedded game. In the simple game one player makes a proposal on how to split the 
surplus, also called a “pie”. If the other player accepts the proposal, they split the surplus 
according to the proposal. If not, the whole surplus is lost. The game theoretical prediction is that 
the player making the offer will maximize his or her share of the surplus. If the player making 
the offer proposes the smallest possible nonzero amount ε > 0 to the other player, acceptance is a 
strictly dominant response. Experimental outcomes differ from theory. In laboratory games, 
proposers typically offer about 30%-50% of the surplus to the responder. Additionally, 
responders often reject offers lower than 30% of the surplus (Slonim 1998).  
Returning to the embedded game of the legal bargaining framework, the law and 
economics literature has two seminal models. Bebchuck (1984) describes a screening game, 
where the uninformed defendant makes a single take-it-or-leave-it offer to the informed plaintiff. 
Under the appropriate conditions, the optimal offer is a screening offer that is accepted by a 
plaintiff with a weak case (the low claim in the example above) and rejected by a plaintiff with a 
strong case (the high claim in the example above). Thus, the dispute rate is equal to the 
probability of a plaintiff having a strong case. This game is described in more detail in Chapter 2. 
Reinganum and Wilde (1986) analyze a signaling game when the informed plaintiff makes the 
offer. Under the right conditions, a semi-pooling equilibrium will emerge. In this equilibrium, 
plaintiffs with a weak case will sometimes reveal their type with a low offer, and sometimes 
bluff with a high offer. Plaintiffs with a strong case will pool with the bluffing weak case 
plaintiffs on the high offer. Disputes occur because the defendant must reject some of the high 
offers to discourage bluffing by weak plaintiffs. This game is also discussed in more detail in 
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Chapter 2. In these types of single take-it-or-leave-it games, the offer is made under conditions 
of informational asymmetry, and this is the root cause of predicted dispute rates. Pecorino and 
Van Boening (henceforth PVB, 2018), conduct an experimental study on the screening and 
signaling games. They find that in both games there are excess disputes (the empirical dispute 
rate is above the theoretically predicted rate), and that players offer positive surplus to others 
even when the strict game theoretical offer would be zero. Even with a positive surplus offer, 
they observe excess disputes, especially over small quantities of surplus. 
In these games, transmission of information can potentially lead to higher settlement 
rates, i.e., lower dispute rates, both theoretically and empirically. For example, in the screening 
game, if a plaintiff with a strong case could signal that she has a strong case, the optimal offer for 
the defendant could be to make her an offer that will lead to settlement. Previous experimental 
research has looked at direct information transmission in this setting. In PVB (2004), the plaintiff 
can send a message about her type to the defendant. In one treatment, the signal was credible. In 
another treatment she could engage in “cheap talk” by sending an unreliable signal about her 
type to the defendant. When the signal is credible, players with a strong case experience lower 
dispute rates. PVB (2015) also looked at a costly disclosure mechanism in the screening game, 
where the plaintiff pays a fee to send a credible signal to the defendant. In PVB (2019), they 
looked at a costly disclosure mechanism in the signaling game. Such mechanisms remove 
information asymmetry and reduce the dispute rate in cases involving high-claim plaintiffs, 
albeit less than predicted. That is, excess disputes are still observed. 
An alternative way to signal a willingness to settle is via offers and counteroffers. This 
has not yet been addressed by the literature. Previous experimental research has found that in 
both the signaling and screening single-offer games, players offer positive surplus to the other 
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party in their take-it-or-leave-it offer, and that there are excess disputes above the predicted rate. 
This study replicates the single-offer games as control and replication, and then modifies those 
frameworks in two different ways. In the first modification, the proposers can make as many 
take-it-or-leave-it offers as they want in a set time period. This allows a proposer to change 
his/her offer if the previous one is not accepted. The second modification is a bilateral 
negotiation in which both players can submit offers as well as counteroffers and either player can 
accept the other’s offer. The multiple offer game is a complex setting for which formal 
theoretical predictions have not yet been formally derived. This study is an empirical 
investigation of different mechanisms which can potentially lower the incidence of dispute and 
thereby lead to efficiency gains. The bilateral negotiation is analogous to the Smith & Williams 
(1983) experimental study on alternative bid/ask queue mechanisms in the double auction. 
1.2 Research Questions 
Here, the behavior of subjects is investigated in a controlled experimental environment 
with alternative negotiation mechanisms as treatments. The contribution to the literature is in the 
form of allowing multiple offers and counter offers during a single round of a legal bargaining 
game. 
The basic research question is: Can repeated offer mechanisms facilitate settlement, and 
if so, which mechanism is the most effective? There are two primary observed variables: 1) the 
dispute rate, which is the percentage of negotiations that fail to reach an agreement and head to 
trial, and 2) the offer, which is the amount of money that a player is proposing as a settlement. 
The offer is expressed both in absolute amount (the amount of money a player is proposing as a 
settlement), and as the surplus amount (how much from the surplus from settlement is included 
in the offer). 
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The design, explained in more detail in Chapter 3, contains five different games. Two are 
one-sided, single-offer games, replications of the screening and signaling games from the 
literature.  They are replicated to control for differences in environment (Davis & Holt, 1993) 
between this study and PVB 2018, e.g., this design is computerized while theirs was not, a 
different subject pool is used, etc. The next three games are novel contributions. Two are one-
sided, multiple-offer games. In those two games (here called the multiple-offer screening and 
multiple-offer signaling games), the proposer can modify his/her take-it-or-leave-it offer if it is 
not accepted. The final game is the bilateral negotiation game, which is a two-sided multiple-
offer game. Both players can make offers and counteroffers or accept an offer from the other 
side. In all three multiple-offer games, the negotiation period has a time limit. 
Data on dispute rates, offer sizes and surplus sizes are collected from all five games, and 
are then compared to determine which mechanism facilitates settlement the best. Chapter 2 
discusses the literature on the screening and signaling games. Chapter 3 discusses the 
experimental design, including a formal statement of the research hypothesis. Chapters 4 through 
6 cover each game type individually. Chapter 4 covers the replication of the single-offer 
screening and signaling games. Chapter 5 covers the multiple-offer screening and multiple-offer 
signaling games. Chapter 6 covers the bilateral multiple-offer game. The experimental results are 
then analyzed across games in a comprehensive comparison in Chapter 7, which also provides a 
conclusion. 
1.3. Summary Results 
 The one-sided single-offer game replications find results that are consistent with the ones 
reported by the literature. Thus, computerization of the game did not affect observed outcomes. 
There are four key main findings in this study. The first finding is that subjects make use of the 
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multiple-offer mechanism. The second key finding is that the dispute rate between the plaintiff 
and the defendant decreases significantly in cases with a high claim when a one-sided multiple-
offer mechanism is introduced. The bilateral mechanism does not cause any significant further 
reduction in high clam dispute rates. The third finding is related to the second. When the high 
claim plaintiff and the defendant have a lower dispute rate in the multiple-offer games, the 
defendant seems to be the primary beneficiary. Finally, the fourth key finding is that the bilateral 
multiple-offer mechanism decreases disputes between a bluffing low claim plaintiff and the 
defendant by giving her the opportunity to accept one of the defendant’s offers. 
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature on the ultimatum game extends across economics, psychology, and law. 
Güth, Schmittberger, and Schwarze (1982) first examined the behavior of subjects in a simple 
ultimatum game. Relevant surveys of the literature include Thaler (1988), Roth (1995), Camerer 
and Thaler (1995), and Fehr and Schmidt (2000). The literature finds a significant deviation from 
the predicted game-theoretical outcome for the ultimatum game. As described in the 
introduction, human players make non-zero offers and sometimes reject non-zero offers. Both 
behaviors contradict the theoretically predicted actions of a strictly rational player. 
The literature attempts to identify the source of this behavior. Hoffman and Spitzer 
(1985) investigate the effect of earning the right to make the offer on player behavior. In their 
study players first participate in a contest to determine who is the proposer and who is the 
responder. When the players “earn the right” to be the proposer, the proposer tends to offer less 
of the surplus to the responder and the responder accepts these low offers more often. Hoffman 
et al. (1994) investigate the experimenter-observation effect in a dictator game. In the dictator 
game, the proposer makes the allocation of the surplus, while the responder must accept it. The 
experiment was conducted in a double-anonymous environment where experimenters would be 
unable to match an offer with a specific proposer. The proposers were aware of their anonymity. 
In that game, two thirds of the proposers kept the whole surplus for themselves. In dictator 
games without double anonymity, such as in Forsythe et al. (1988), only 21% of the proposers 
kept the whole surplus for themselves, with an additional 21% of them offering half the surplus 
to the responder. Anonymity influences offers in the dictator game. This is presumed evidence 
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for fairness concerns by players, who might not want to appear as “stingy” to a third observing 
party (the experimenter).  
Bebchuck (1984) embeds the ultimatum game in a legal bargaining scenario similar to 
the one discussed in the introduction. The uninformed defendant is not informed of the size of 
the legal claim of the informed plaintiff, but only of the distribution of possible outcomes. He 
makes an offer to the plaintiff. Acceptance of the offer terminates the round, while a dispute 
leads to costly litigation. If the defendant makes an offer that only the low type plaintiff would 
accept, this is called a screening game, because the offer screens the plaintiffs according to their 
type. A weak claim plaintiff accepts the screening offer, while a strong claim plaintiff rejects it. 
In Reinganum and Wilde’s signaling game (1986), the informed plaintiff makes the offer. This 
offer can act as a signal as to the plaintiff’s type. When a plaintiff with a weak claim makes a 
low offer, then this is a revealing offer. A plaintiff with a weak claim will sometimes bluff and 
pretend they have a strong case by making a high offer. In the semi-pooling equilibrium, the 
strong case plaintiff and the bluffing weak case plaintiff pool on a single high offer. The 
uninformed defendant knows that there is a possibility they are facing a bluffing plaintiff. The 
defendant will reject the high offer at a probability that makes the weak plaintiffs indifferent 
between the high bluffing offer and the low revealing offer. Likewise, in the semi-pooling 
equilibrium, weak plaintiffs will bluff at a rate that makes the defendant indifferent between 
accepting or rejecting the high offer. The predicted dispute rate will depend upon which high 
pooling offer the plaintiffs choose. In both the screening and the signaling games, the surplus 
that the two players are splitting is the avoidable cost of litigation. 
Pecorino and Van Boening (PVB, 2018) construct an experimental study of the Bebchuck 
screening game and Reinganum and Wilde signaling game using identical parameters. This 
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allows for direct comparison of surplus offered and dispute rates across the two games. They find 
that screening behavior by the defendant leads to outcomes fairly close to the theoretical 
prediction. However, they also find that players still tend to offer positive amounts of surplus and 
that there are excess disputes over the theoretically predicted rate. Turning the game into a 
signaling game makes it “cognitively much more challenging” (PVB 2018) for players. The 
defendant needs to discriminate between legitimate offers from a high-claim plaintiff and bluffs 
from a low-claim plaintiff, and simultaneously, the weak and strong plaintiffs need to pool on a 
single high offer. The authors find that the semi-pooling equilibrium does a plausible but less 
than perfect job of aggregating the data. For example, they find that a) there are persistent 
anomalous offers in between low revealing offers and high bluffs, and that these are sometimes 
accepted (a rational defendant should reject such an offer) and, b) the dispute rate is similar in 
both games, albeit for different reasons. A more detailed review of PVB 2018 signaling and 
screening games follows in Section 2.1. 
Farmer and Pecorino (2004) provide a theoretical framework that introduces fairness into 
the legal bargaining game. Players who are interested in fairness dispute offers more often. In 
Pecorino and Van Boening (2010), the authors study the extent to which fairness affects 
empirical outcomes. They find that in the embedded game, proposers offer a much smaller 
amount of surplus (median offer of 8% compared to 50% in the simple game), and that 
responders are more willing to accept such low offers. They also find that the size of the 
plaintiff’s claim does not significantly affect the surplus size and dispute rates. 
Information exchange between the two players can affect the size of the offer and the 
dispute rate. In Shavell’s (1989) theory, all disputes settle out of court. Plaintiffs with a high 
claim will always reveal their claim and the defendant will settle. Plaintiffs with a low claim 
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remain silent and receive a low offer from the defendant and settle. The Pecorino and Van 
Boening (2004) experimental study examines the effects of information exchange between the 
two players as proposed by Shavell (1989) and find results consistent with that theory. If a player 
can credibly reveal her information without cost, then players with a high claim will reveal, 
while players with a low claim will not. The authors then allow for non-credible “cheap talk” 
information exchange between the players and find that, as predicted, non-credible information 
leads to results consistent with theory. Low claim plaintiffs pretend that they are high type, high 
claim plaintiffs reveal their type. The defendant ignores the message. 
If a plaintiff can transmit a signal indicating her type, then the defendant B can take this 
information into account. PVB study costly information disclosure in the screening game (PVB 
2015) and in the signaling game (PVB 2019). In those studies, the plaintiff can choose to send 
information about her claim to the defendant. Transmitting that information is costly, but the 
recipient knows that the signal is credible. In the screening game (PVB 2015), PVB calculate 
that in theory neither type of plaintiff should reveal their information. A plaintiff with a low 
claim has nothing to gain by revealing her information, as she receives a screening offer equal to 
her dispute payoff regardless or not if she reveals her type. Similarly, a plaintiff with a high 
claim also does not reveal her type. If she remains silent, she receives a screening offer, which 
she rejects, and she gets her dispute payoff. If she reveals her type, she receives an offer equal to 
her dispute payoff – but she also pays the cost of sending the signal. Thus, in theory, her payoff 
of revealing is lower than remaining silent. Empirically, strong claim plaintiffs reveal their type 
42% of the time and gain approximately zero return, as on average, the defendant makes an offer 
that is slightly higher than the plaintiff’s dispute payoff. In the signaling game, under the theory 
(PVB 2018) all plaintiffs with a low claim remain silent. A low claim plaintiff makes an offer 
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equal to the defendant’s low claim dispute cost and revealing her information does not gain her 
additional payoff. Plaintiffs with a high claim choose to disclose their information and make an 
offer equal to the defendant’s high claim dispute cost. Empirically, 75% of low claim plaintiffs 
remain silent, and 67% of high claim ones disclose their information. While disclosure does not 
enter the discussion in this study, the PVB 2015 and 2018 baseline results, where disclosure was 
not an option, are used here as additional points of comparison for the one-sided single-offer 
games. 
Finally, Wills (2018) studies different framings of the embedded ultimatum game in an 
experimental study. He tests the framing effect in simple and embedded single-offer ultimatum 
games. He finds that in games where the plaintiff makes a demand the mean offer is higher than 
when the defendant makes an offer to the plaintiff. Dispute rates are similar in both. He finds that 
this holds for both the simple and the embedded game. 
2.1. Pecorino and Van Boening 2018 
In PVB 2018, the authors conduct an experimental version of the embedded ultimatum 
signaling and screening games. The subjects are either Player A or Player B. Player A, the 
plaintiff, has a claim on Player B, the defendant. There is a 2/3 probability of the claim being 
“low”, hereafter “L”, and a 1/3 probability of being “high”, hereafter “H”. The size of the claim 
determines Player A’s type: AL or AH. The size of the claim is Player A’s private information. 
Claims are denoted in US cents. A low claim is 150 units (equal to $1.50), and a high claim is 
450 units ($4.50). In the screening game, Player B makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to Player A. 
In the signaling game, Player A makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to Player B. In both games, if 
the offer is accepted, the round ends and Player B pays Player A the amount of the agreed offer. 
If the offer is rejected, both players incur a fee of FA = FB = 75. In the event of a dispute, Player 
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A wins the value of her claim with probability 1: AL wins a judgement of 150, and AH wins 450. 
After the fee is paid, AL’s dispute payoff is 150 – 75 = 75 and AH’s dispute payoff is 450 – 75 = 
375. Player B pays the judgement plus FB. Against AL his dispute cost is 150 + 75 = 225, and 
against AH it is 450 + 75 = 525. Under these parameters, the surplus that the two players 
negotiate over is the sum of the avoidable legal fees (75 + 75 = 150). In both games, the player 
making the offer has an incentive to extract as much of this surplus as possible and make the 
other party indifferent between settling or going to trial. The PVB 2018 parameters are 
summarized in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1. PVB 2018 Dispute Payoffs and Costs at Trial 
Negotiation 
Judgement at 
Trial  
A’s Dispute 
Fee FA 
B’s Dispute 
Fee FB 
A’s Dispute 
Payoff 
B’s Dispute 
Cost 
B vs. AL 150 75 75 75 225 
B vs. AH 450 75 75 375 525 
 
2.1.1. PVB 2018 Screening Game 
In the screening game, Player B makes an offer to Player A. Player B does not know 
Player A’s claim, only the probability it is H (1/3) or L (2/3). In the complete information game, 
a strictly rational player B would offer 75 to AL and 375 to AH. These offers equal the respective 
dispute payoffs at trial and make Player A indifferent between settling and going to trial. When 
the game becomes one of asymmetric information, theory predicts that B makes the low offer of 
75 to all A players. This is a screening offer, since in theory only AL accepts it. Thus, the 
predicted dispute rate is 0% for AL and 100% for AH, for an overall dispute rate of 33% (i.e., A’s 
probability of being AH). Empirically, any offer 75 – 225 is consistent with screening type 
behavior, as B makes an offer that theoretically only AL would accept. Any offer 76 – 224 
contains positive surplus for AL. The high offer of 375 is a pooling offer, since it is theoretically 
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acceptable to both AL and AH. However, under the PVB 2018 parameters pooling is not 
predicted to occur. (Empirically, any offer 375 – 525 is consistent with pooling.) 
Predictions and PVB 2018 data from the screening game are presented in Table 2.2. In 
the screening game, the authors find that Player B makes a screening offer 87% of the time (in 
Round 7 to the end this percentage rises to 92%, not shown in Table 2.2).  The mean surplus 
offered to Player A is 36.6, which is about one fifth of the total surplus. The median surplus offer 
is 25, which is one sixth of the surplus. Both are above the theoretical prediction that Player B 
offers 0 surplus to Player A. The observed Player AL dispute rate is 16% when B makes an offer 
75 – 225. These are excess disputes, because Player AL rejects offers that theory says she should 
accept. Player AH disputes 98% of offers 75 – 225, which is close to the predicted 100%. 
Additionally, not shown in the table, B is not predicted to make offers 375 – 525 but he 
occasionally does. For these offers, the observed dispute rate is 0% for AL (as theory predicts) 
and 13% for AH (the predicted rate is 0%). The excess dispute rate for AL on offers 75 – 225 
(16%) is comparable to the excess dispute rate for AH in offers 375 – 525 (13%). 
Table 2.2. PVB 2018 Screening Game Predictions and Outcomes 
  Screening Offers (75-225) 
  Offers   
   Observed  Dispute Rate 
Player  Predicted 
Pct. 
(Ratio) 
Offer Mean 
(Median) 
Surplus Mean 
(Median)a  Predicted Observed 
B 
screening 
 75 
87% 
(350/402) 
111.6 
(100) 
36.6 
(25)  
AL : 0% 
AH :100% 
AL : 16% 
AH : 98% 
a The mean surplus that AL receives from settlement is the difference between the mean(median) observed offer 
and the predicted 75. 
  
2.1.2. PVB 2018 Signaling Game 
In the signaling game, Player A can signal her type by the offer she makes to Player B. 
One characteristic of signaling games is that there are generally multiple equilibria. In the PVB 
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2018 semi-pooling equilibrium, Player A can signal that she is type AL by making a revealing 
offer of 225, which equals B’s dispute cost versus her type (recall Table 2.1). Alternatively, she 
can bluff by making an offer that would mimic Player AH. Player B knows there is a chance of a 
bluff from an AL player. Therefore, a high offer is untrustworthy, and Player B will reject it at a 
probability r that makes AL indifferent between bluffing and making a revealing offer. 
Simultaneously, AL will bluff at a rate b which makes B indifferent between accepting and 
rejecting the bluff. Player AH makes a separating offer between 375 and 525 (called separating 
because it separates her from an AL revealing offer of 225). However, in the semi-pooling 
equilibrium, Player AH and bluffing AL will pool on the same high offer between (and including) 
375 and 525. The precise offer they pool on is jointly contingent on the rate r at which Player B 
rejects the high offer and the rate b at which AL bluffs. That is, these three are simultaneously 
determined. In the semi-pooling equilibrium, a) AH and bluffing AL pool on the same high offer, 
b) AL is just indifferent between bluffing and revealing given B’s rejection rate and, c) B is just 
indifferent between accepting and rejecting the high offer given AL’s bluffing rate. These points 
make the signaling game cognitively challenging for experimental subjects relative to the 
screening game. 
Predictions and PVB 2018 observations on the signaling game are presented in Table 2.3. 
The authors find that the signaling game AL offers are reasonably consistent with semi-pooling 
(PVB 2018). They find that AL reveals her type 63% of the time and bluffs 12% of the time (not 
shown in the table, in Rounds 7 to end, these frequencies are 81% and 8%, respectively). The 
semi-pooling predictions do a reasonably good job of aggregating the data, but there are some 
notable deviations. In particular, a) Player B rejects the high offers more often than predicted 
(see next paragraph), b) AH and bluffing AL and are unable to pool on a single high semi-pooling 
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mean offer (see mean offers in Table 2.3) and, c) AL bluffs less than she is expected to in part 
because AL experiences a higher than expected rejection rate on her bluffs (85% in Table 2.3).
1 
PVB also report a number of anomalous “between offers” ranging from 226 to 374 which 
decreases from 22% to 11% as subjects gain experience. Those offers are always theoretically 
rejected by Player B using a simple dominance argument. Player B knows that AH would never 
ask for less than 375 (AH’s dispute payoff). Therefore, he knows it is Player AL making the offer. 
Player B would then rather dispute and pay 225, which is his dispute cost against AL. What 
drives Player A to make a such an offer is unclear. However, empirically, Player B sometimes 
accepts those “between offers”, which reinforces AL’s behavior. 
Table 2.3. PVB 2018 Signaling Game Predictions and Outcomes 
  Signaling Offers (75-225), Bluffs and Separating Offers (375-525) 
  Offers   
   Observed  Dispute Rate 
Player  Predicted 
Pct. 
(Ratio) 
Offer Mean 
(Median) 
Surplus Mean 
(Median)a  Predicted Observed 
AL 
revealing 
 225 
63% 
(173/276) 
203.6 
(220) 
21.4 
(5) 
 0% 10% 
AL 
bluffing 
 375-525 
12% 
(34/276) 
417.5 
(400) 
--  50-67% 85% 
AH  375-525 
91% 
(71/74) 
454.9 
(450) 
--  50-67% 63% 
a The mean surplus that A receives from settlement is the difference between the mean(median) observed offer 
and the predicted 75 (if L). Surplus is defined for offers in the 375-525 range. However, there is no unique point 
estimate of a pooling offer for which to calculate surplus. 
 
As in the screening game, there are excess disputes. In the signaling game, B rejects 10% 
of the AL revealing offers 75 – 225; the predicted value is 0%. These disputes are typically over 
small amounts of surplus. He rejects 16% of the 75 – 225 offers when offered less than 1/6th of 
                                                 
1 Player B’s dispute rate on AL bluffs is 85% compared to 63% on AH offers. This suggests that B rejects offers 375 
– 525 at a different rate depending on who they came from. However, when B evaluates an offer, he does not know 
A’s type. The mean AL 375 – 525 offer is 418, and the mean AH offer is 455. Whether or not B can distinguish 
between Player A types based on this information is an open question; see PVB 2019. 
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the surplus, and 3% when offered more than 1/6th (not shown in table, see PVB 2018). On offers 
375-525 B’s overall dispute rate is 76% (74/105)2, which is above the upper end of the predicted 
interval of 50-67%. 
2.2. Overview 
 Comparing the results from the screening and signaling games, there are two main 
findings. First, in both games, players offer positive surplus not predicted by theory. Second, 
there are excess disputes over the theoretical prediction in both games. As shown in Table 2.4, 
the excess dispute rate is about 20% in the screening game and roughly 30% in the signaling 
game. Together these two findings suggest that fairness concerns are empirically important as 
they lead to loss of efficiency. A mechanism that helps players resolve fairness concerns can 
potentially facilitate settlement and thereby increase efficiency. There are two different 
mechanisms investigated in this study. The first mechanism gives the proposer the ability to 
make repeated offers until time expires. The second mechanism gives both players the ability to 
make offers and counter offers and allows either player to accept an offer. One or both of those 
mechanisms can potentially help players find a “fair” offer and facilitate pre-trial settlement. An 
empirical question arises: Will offers and counteroffers reduce or eliminate excess dispute rates? 
There are some selected results from the literature that will be directly compared to 
results from this study. Results from PVB 2018 are considered, as well as results from the 
baseline experiments in the two PVB costly disclosure studies about the signaling game (PVB 
2015) and the screening game (PVB 2018). In those two studies, no disclosure was allowed 
during the baseline. All three experiments use the same parameters as described in Table 2.1, 
                                                 
2 From Table 2.3: 85% of the 34 AL bluffs are rejected, and 63% of the 71 AH offers are rejected. The total number 
of 375-525 offers is 34 + 71 = 105. So, the rejection rate is 
0.85 (34)+0.63 (71)
105
= 0.70. 
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which allows for a direct comparison of results. The screening game results from the PVB 2015 
baseline are similar to PVB 2018. Likewise for the signaling game results from PVB 2018 and 
PVB 2018. These data provide reliable benchmarks against the results of this study. 
Table 2.4 lists the percentage of all offers made by a player in a theory-conforming 
interval. Player B makes offers 75-225 to screen between AL and AH. In both PVB studies that 
contain a screening game, the amount of screening offers is about 85-87%. Player AL makes 
either a revealing offer (75-225), or a bluff (375-525). In both studies that contain a screening 
game, the revealing offers are 63-64%, and the bluffs are 12-15%. Finally, AH makes a 
separating offer 91 or 62% of the time. This is quite a large deviation between the two studies. 
Table 2.4. Offer Percentages Comparison (Literature) 
   Offer Percentage by Study 
Game 
Player(s) Offer Interval 
 
PVB 2018 PVB 2015 PVB 2019 
Screening      
B 75-225  87% 85% -- 
Signaling      
AL revealing 75-225  63% -- 64% 
AL bluffing 375-525  12% -- 15% 
AH 375-525  91% -- 62% 
 
Table 2.5 presents the means of surplus offers in the 75-225 interval. B offers about 36 
cents to A, while AL offers about 21-28 units to B. Thus, in the literature, Player B is slightly 
more generous than AL. In the high offer interval, 375-525, players AL and AH fail to pool on the 
same value, with AL sending relatively lower offers than AH (417 and 438 v. 455 and 452, 
respectively). 
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Table 2.5. Mean Surplus/Offer Comparison (Literature) 
   Mean Surplus/Offer in each interval by Study 
Game 
Player(s) Offer Interval 
 
PVB 2018 PVB 2015 PVB 2019 
Screening      
B 75-225  36.6 35.2 -- 
Signaling      
AL revealing 75-225  21.4 -- 28.7 
AL bluffing 375-525  417.5 -- 437.9 
AH 375-525  454.9 -- 451.6 
 
Finally, Table 2.6 shows dispute rates. Dispute rates relevant to this study are listed. In 
the screening game, Player AL disputes with B about 16-20% of the time, and AH disputes with B 
98% of the time. In the signaling game, B disputes with a revealing AL only about 10-14%, while 
he disputes with a bluffing one 71-85% of the time. B disputes with separating AH 73% of the 
time. The rest of the listed dispute rates will be more relevant once all games are discussed 
together in Chapter 7. 
Table 2.6. Dispute Rate Comparison (Literature) 
   Dispute Rate in each interval by Study 
Game 
Player(s) Offer Interval 
 
PVB 2018 PVB 2015 PVB 2019 
Screening      
B v. AL All Offers  0.16 0.20 -- 
B v. AL 75-225  0.17 0.18 -- 
Signaling      
AL v. B All Offers  0.16 -- 0.31 
AL v. B 75-225  0.10 -- 0.14 
AL v. B 375-525  0.85 -- 0.71 
AH v. B All Offers  0.73 -- 0.69 
AH v. B 375-525  0.73 -- 0.73 
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CHAPTER 3. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
This study investigates two effects in a computerized embedded ultimatum game 
experiment: a) the multiple-offer effect and b) the negotiation effect. A multiple-offer effect 
exists if empirical offers and dispute rates in multiple-offer games are different than those 
observed in single-offer games. A negotiation effect exists if offers and dispute rates in the 
bilateral negotiation game are different than those observed in one-sided multiple-offer games. A 
combined effect exists if offers and dispute rates in the bilateral negotiation game are different 
than in one-sided single-offer games. Section 3.1 formulates the overarching research hypothesis. 
Section 3.2 discusses the experimental design of this study. Section 3.3 details the procedures 
used in conducting the computerized experiment. 
3.1. Research Hypothesis 
 Can multiple offers and counteroffers facilitate settlement in the embedded ultimatum 
game?  To answer this question, two broad hypotheses are tested: 1) The dispute rate will change 
when players are allowed to make multiple offers and counter offers, and 2) the offers players 
make are more equitable compared to single-offer games. “More equitable offers” are defined as 
those that offer a more equal amount of surplus to the other player. Thus, the following three 
principal null hypotheses are tested: 
H1 – Single-sided Multiple Offer effect: there is no effect on 1) offer sizes, 2) surplus, 
and 3) dispute rates when multiple offers are allowed compared to the one-sided single-
offer game. 
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H2 – Bilateral Negotiation Effect: There is no effect on 1) offer sizes, 2) surplus, and 3) 
dispute rates when both players can make multiple offers and counteroffers compared to 
the one-sided multiple-offer game. 
H3 – Combined Effect: There is no effect on 1) offer sizes, 2) surplus, and 3) dispute 
rates when both players can make multiple offers and counteroffers compared to the one-
sided single-offer game. 
The analysis will consider both all offers and those that are consistent with the theory. In 
theory, players should only make offers that fall between certain offer ranges, as all other offers 
are eliminated by simple dominance arguments. However, offers outside the theory-predicted 
intervals are still allowed to be made and are empirically observed. The theory behind the one-
offer games is covered by PVB (2018) and was presented in Section 2.1. In the one-sided 
multiple-offer game, the game theoretical prediction is that the proposer still makes the offer that 
maximizes his or her surplus, and that other offers should not be made. In theory, allowing for 
multiple offers should be equivalent to making one offer. However, the multiple-offer 
mechanism might still introduce previously unobserved behavioral effects. The bilateral 
negotiation setting is a complex game for which no formal theoretical predictions have been yet 
derived. 
3.2. Design Overview 
 Table 3.1 presents the experimental design for this study. In all games, a maximum of 10 
pairs per session could be recruited. In all sessions, subjects participated for 30 rounds.3 In each 
game, each negotiating pair produced one negotiation per round. Thus, the number of 
                                                 
3 Participants were not told the number of rounds to avoid end-of-session effects. 
21 
 
participating pairs in a session is multiplied by the number of rounds in the session, and the 
product is the number of observations from that session. In all games, the ex-ante probability of 
Player A being type AH is 33%. 
Table 3.1. Experimental Design 
   No. of Negotiations  
Game Pairs Rounds n B v. AL B v. AH % AH 
Average Earnings 
(min, max) 
One-Sided 
Single-Offer 
     
 
 
   ScrS-1 4 30 120 92 28 23% $24.42 (17.75, 31.05) 
   SigS-1 7 30 210 161 49 23% $23.19 (12.21, 39.68) 
One-Sided 
Multiple-Offer 
     
 
 
   ScrM-1 6 30 180 126 54 30% $25.15 (12.21, 34.30) 
   ScrM-2 5 30 150 85 65 43% $23.97 (10.25, 30.59) 
      Subtotal 11 30 330 211 119 36% $24.61 (10.25, 34.30) 
   SigM-1 6 30 180 132 48 27% $24.60 (  6.31, 34.02) 
   SigM-2 5 30 150 100 50 33% $25.69 (15.55, 30.16) 
      Subtotal 11 30 330 232 98 30% $25.10 (  6.31, 34.02) 
Bilateral 
Multiple-Offer 
     
 
 
   BMO-1 8 30 240 136 104 43% $25.44 (17.35, 35.75) 
   BMO-2 8 30 240 136 104 43% $23.63 (10.09, 36.45) 
   BMO-3 4 30 120 84 36 30% $21.80 (  5.50, 41.75) 
   BMO-4 5 30 150 120 30 20% $24.45 (10.45, 33.20) 
      Subtotal 25 30 750 476 274 37% $24.08 (  5.50, 41.75) 
 
The single-offer Signaling and Screening Games are called ScrS and SigS, respectively. 
There was one session of each, denoted ScrS-1 and SigS-1. Only one session of each was 
conducted due to the stability of results from previous studies (see Table 2.4) and the sessions 
from this study replicated these results. There are a total of 330 observations on the one-sided 
single-offer games, 120 on the screening game, and 210 on the signaling game. More 
observations were deemed appropriate for the signaling game, as PVB (2018) suggest that it is 
relatively more “cognitively challenging” for subjects. 
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More data were collected for the new games: two sessions for each one-sided multiple-
offer game and four sessions for the bilateral multiple offer game. The multiple-offer screening 
and signaling games are called ScrM and SigM, respectively. There were two sessions conducted 
for each game, denoted ScrM-1, ScrM-2, SigM-1, and SigM-2. In these two games, players 
should theoretically make the same offer that they make in the single-offer gamed. However, 
multiple offers can potentially allow players to address fairness concerns. There are a total of 330 
negotiations for each of the two games. 
Finally, the mechanism where both sides can make multiple offers is the bilateral 
multiple-offer game and is called BMO. Four sessions of the BMO game were conducted, BMO-
1, BMO-2, BMO-3, and BMO-4. More sessions were needed for the BMO game, since there is 
no underlying theory for that game. There are 750 observations on the bilateral multiple-offer 
game. 
 The ex-post probability of Player A being type AH was relatively close to the ex-ante 
33% in the multiple-offer games (36%, 30% and 37% in ScrM, SigM and BMO, respectively), 
but was slightly lower for the single-offer games (23% in both ScrS and SigS). Average payoffs 
were roughly equal across all five different games. 
The minimum experimental earnings were $5.50, and the maximum earnings were 
$41.75. In PVB 2018, subjects typically played 12 rounds, while in this study, subjects play 30 
rounds. To keep payoffs similar, and use the same parameters as the PVB studies, 12 of the 30 
rounds were randomly chosen to determine the subjects’ earnings. The 12 rounds were randomly 
selected by the computer program at the end of the session. Player A accumulated a payoff 
during the game. Her total earnings were the sum of her payoffs from 12 randomly selected 
rounds. Player B accumulated a cost during the game. His total earnings were the sum of his cost  
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from the 12 randomly selected game rounds subtracted from a lump sum of $55. B’s lump sum is 
his private information. 
3.3. Experimental Procedure 
 To ensure that there are no session specific events, all sessions were conducted as 
similarly as possible. The experiment was conducted using the z-Tree software (Fischbacher 
2007). The game code for all five games was written specifically for this study by the author. 
The code that chooses the 12 random payoff rounds was borrowed from Wills (2018). Sessions 
were conducted in the Mississippi Experimental Research Laboratory at the University of 
Mississippi. The experiment only refers to the players as Player A and Player B and does not 
utilize legal terminology such as “plaintiff, defendant, trial”, in order to limit any implicit bias by 
the subjects. 
Copies of the experimental instructions given to subjects, the study information sheet, the 
record sheet, receipt, and screenshots of the computerized game are provided in the Appendix. 
Prior to any subject interaction, Institutional Review Board (IRB) permission was obtained, 
protocol number 19x-181. All subjects were required to confirm that they were over 18 years of 
age and were given the option to withdraw from the study at any point. No subject exercised the 
right to withdraw. Each experimental session lasted approximately 75 minutes, including time to 
check in, participate, and receive cash payment at the end. Each experimental session was run 
according to the following procedure. 
1. Subjects were recruited from undergraduate courses at the University of Mississippi 
through in-class announcements and advertising fliers in common areas. Potential recruits 
were informed of the time commitment of the study, the potential payoff, and that they 
would be participating in a “decision making study” conducted by the Department of 
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Economics. No specific details on the games or the research question were given to 
potential recruits. 
2. Recruited subjects signed up on the SONA website. SONA registration allowed for 
subjects to be contacted when a session is announced, and it ensured no subject 
participated more than once in the study. 
3. On the day of the session, subjects arrived at the Mississippi Experimental Research 
Laboratory (MERL). Check in was allowed 15 minutes before the scheduled start of the 
session. During check in, subjects were randomly assigned a computer station by pulling 
a numbered lot from a cup. Subjects were not allowed to interact with their assigned 
computer until all subjects had checked in and the experiment began. While waiting, 
subjects could review the Study Information Sheet. All stations had a provided pen and a 
Record Sheet, which the subject could use to take notes during the session. In the event of 
an odd number of subjects, one volunteer received a show-up fee and was dismissed.  
4. The experimental session began. Subjects were no longer allowed to talk to each other 
and were asked to put their cellphones and other electronics away. The experimenter 
handed out and read the instructions. Subjects were allowed questions. 
5. After all questions had been answered, the computer program was launched. Subjects 
completed a short instructional tutorial that familiarized them with the layout of the 
screen and the procedure to submit and/or accept offers. 
6. Once all subjects completed the tutorial, Round 1 began. The experimenter sat quietly 
and did not intervene unless there was a technological issue. There were no technical 
issues during any of the sessions in this study and all sessions completed the 30 
scheduled rounds. 
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7. Once Round 30 concluded, the experimenter announced the end of the session. Computer 
screens displayed the final history for each subject, the rounds chosen to determine 
payoff, and the subject’s payoff. Subjects took notes of those rounds and the payoff 
amount on their record sheets. The experimenter passed out blank receipts. Subjects filled 
out the personal information required for the experimenter to be reimbursed. 
8. The experimenter retrieved the data file from the server running the program. The data 
file contained payment information for each subject. Subjects were individually called by 
station number to the experimenter’s table. The order by which they were called was 
generated by the computer. Subjects submitted their record sheet and receipt. The 
experimenter cross checked the noted payoff on the record sheet with the computer 
output. The experimenter then paid the amount, rounded up to the nearest 25 cents and 
the subject was dismissed.4 The next subject was called, until all have been privately 
paid. 
9. The output data file was copied and backed up for analysis. Personal information 
listed on the receipt was not used for any data analysis or subject identification. Receipts 
were only used for reimbursement. All participating subjects were marked as completed 
in SONA and were ineligible to sign up for further sessions. 
3.3.1. One-sided Game Structure 
 The experimental procedure for the one-sided games (ScrS, SigS, ScrM, SigM) games is 
based on the embedded ultimatum game as described in PVB (2018). Information on the roles of 
the players and their payoffs from each potential outcome is displayed in Table 3.2. In each 
                                                 
4 To facilitate recruitment, especially during the latter half of the semester, some sessions also paid a show-up fee of 
$5 to subjects. This show-up fee is not included in the earnings column in Table 3.1. 
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game, one player is the proposer, who makes one or multiple offers depending on the game type, 
and the other player is the responder. In the single offer games, the responder chooses to accept 
or reject an offer. In the multiple-offer games, the responder either chooses to accept, wait for a 
different offer, or wait for the 30 second timer to expire. Subjects were told the duration of the 
timer before the first round begun. All are denominated in units of 1 US cent. 
Table 3.2. A Round of the One-sided Negotiation Games 
 Screening (ScrS/ScrM) Signaling (SigS/SigM) 
Proposer Player B Player A 
Responder Player A Player B 
Settlement   
    Player A Payoff B’s Offer A’s Offer 
    Player B Cost B’s Offer A’s Offer 
Dispute (Claim L)   
    Player A Payoff 150 – 75 =   75 150 – 75 =   75 
    Player B Cost 150 + 75 = 225 150 + 75 = 225 
Dispute (Claim H)   
    Player A Payoff 450 – 75 = 375 450 – 75 = 375 
    Player B Cost 450 + 75 = 525 450 + 75 = 525 
 
The steps of a round in those games are listed below. The Appendix contains an exact 
copy of the instructions given and read to subjects. 
1. In each round, a Player A and a Player B are randomly and anonymously paired. Pairs are 
redrawn at the start of each new round. 
2. A random number between 1 and 100 is generated by the computer for each pair.  This 
number determines whether outcome L or H applies for the round. Outcome L applies if 
the random number is less than or equal to 67. Outcome H applies if the random number 
is greater than 67. Only Player A knows the outcome that applies in each round. 
3. The proposer makes an offer to the responder. In single-offer games, the proposer is only 
allowed one offer. The responder accepts it or rejects it, and the negotiation ends. In 
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multiple-offer games, the proposer is allowed 30 seconds to make as many or as few 
offers as he or she wishes. The responder can accept an offer, wait for another offer, or 
wait for the timer to expire. Only the latest offer made by the proposer can be accepted. 
Once an offer is accepted, or the timer runs out, the negotiation ends. 
4. Payoffs and costs are assigned for both players as described in Table 3.2. If an offer is 
accepted, then the payoff and cost are the exact amount of that offer. If an offer is 
rejected (single-offer) or time expires without an acceptance (multiple-offer), subject 
payoffs and costs depend on the outcome L or H and both players incur a fee of 75. The 
fee reduces Player A’s payoff and increases Player B’s cost. Players are informed of their 
own payoff and cost. Player B is told of the outcome (L or H) that applied to the round 
that just ended. 
5. Players review a history of their decisions and payoffs or costs from previous rounds. 
6. After all pairs have completed the round, new random and anonymous pairings are made, 
and the next round begins. Subjects remain the same player type (Player A or Player B) 
throughout the session. 
3.3.2. Bilateral Negotiation Game Structure 
 In the Bilateral game, both players are concurrently a proposer and a responder. Steps 1 
and 2 proceed as in the one-sided game: random pairings are made, and only A is informed of 
the outcome L or H. 
In Step 3, the negotiating period is 30 seconds, during which both players are 
simultaneously proposers and responders. Players may only accept the latest offer made by the 
other player. At the end of the round, payoffs and costs are assigned as described in Table 3.2. 
When an offer is accepted, the player that made the offer is the final proposer, and the player that 
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accepted the offer is the final responder. The player payoffs and costs are then equal to that 
accepted offer. If time expires without an acceptance, then player dispute payoffs and costs are 
invoked as described in Table 3.2. Players then review their results and history of results, and 
pairs are redrawn for the next round. Subjects remain the same player type (Player A or Player 
B) throughout the session.
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CHAPTER 4. ONE-SIDED SINGLE-OFFER GAMES 
The primary reason for conducting the one-sided single-offer games is to replicate results 
from the literature. The computerization of the game did not in general alter the observed 
behavior of players. There are two conventions used throughout this chapter. First, Player A is 
the player with the claim, and Player B transfers money from his lump sum to Player A. If the 
players do not come into an agreement, the parties incur a player-specific litigation cost. In the 
screening game, Player B is the proposer and Player A is the responder. In the signaling game, 
Player A is the proposer and Player B is the responder. Second, all offers are expressed in 
pennies. So, an offer of 75 is an offer of 75 US cents. In this chapter, the signaling and the 
screening game are conducted as replications of the literature: in each game, a player can only 
make a single offer, and the other player can either accept, or reject that single offer. Results 
from this chapter are compared with the literature. 
4.1. Offers in the One-Sided Single-Offer Games 
 Table 4.1 outlines the distribution of the offers made by proposers in the screening and 
signaling games. There are 120 observations in the screening game and 210 observations in the 
signaling game. In the signaling game, the ex-post probability of Player A having a High claim is 
23.3% (161/210 observations are for Player AL, and 49/210 for Player AH). In the screening 
game 91.7% (110/120) of all offers happen in the 75-225 interval, falling in line with the 
theoretical prediction that Player B makes a screening offer. In the signaling game, Player AL 
reveals her type 65.2% (105/161) of the time by making an offer 75-225, and bluffs 10.6% 
(17/161) of the time by making an offer 375-525. Thus, 72.3% of AL’s offers in the signaling 
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game are consistent with theory. Player AH makes a separating offer 375-525 61.2% (30/49) of 
the time. In both games, there are some anomalous offers not predicted by the theory: 8.3% in 
the screening game and 27.7% in the signaling game. The higher amount of non-theory 
conforming offers in the signaling game is consistent with the earlier discussion on the signaling 
game being more cognitively challenging. In PVB 2018, 87% of players B in the screening game 
made an offer 75-225 compared to 91.7% in this study, and 75% of players AL made offers either 
75-225 or 375-525 compared to 75.8% in this study. Players AH made offers 375-525 91% of the 
time in PVB 2018, but only 61.2% of the time in this study. 
 
Table 4.1. Offer Distributions for the One-Sided Single-Offer Games 
Game: Player 
Percent (number) of offers in specified interval; bold face indicates offers 
which are consistent with theory 
Rounds n <75 75-225 226-374 375-525 > 525 
ScrS: B       
All 120  0.8% (1) 91.7% (110) 2.5% (3) 5.0% (6) -- 
R1-15 60  1.7% (1) 90.0%   (54) 5.0% (3) 3.3% (2) -- 
R16-30 60 -- 93.3%   (56) -- 6.7% (4) -- 
SigS: AL       
All 161   8.7% (14) 65.2% (105) 15.5%  (25)a 10.6% (17) -- 
R1-15 84 16.7% (14) 51.2%   (43) 16.7% (14) 15.5% (13) -- 
R16-30 77 -- 80.5%   (62) 14.3% (11) 5.2%     (4) -- 
SigS: AH       
All 49  8.2%  (4) 16.3% (8) 12.2% (6) 61.2% (30) 2.0% (1) 
R1-15 21 19.0% (4) 19.0% (4) 9.5%   (2) 52.4% (11) -- 
R16-30 28 -- 14.3% (4) 14.3% (4) 67.9% (19) 3.6% (1) 
a Eighteen of those offers are made by one subject, in the 370-374 range. 
 
 Section 4.1.1 discusses offers made in the 75-225 range by Player B in the screening 
game and revealing Player AL in the signaling game. Section 4.1.2 discusses offers made in the 
375-535 range by bluffing AL and separating AH. Some of the anomalous offers and their 
implications are discussed alongside disputes in Section 4.2. 
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4.1.1. Offers 75-225 in the One-Sided Single-Offer Games 
 Table 4.2 provides summary statistics of the mean and median offers made in the offer 
range 75-225. For this offer interval, the amount of surplus offered can also be compared. Player 
B offers positive surplus any time he makes an offer above the strictly rational offer of 75 (AL’s 
dispute payoff). Player AL offers positive surplus any time she makes an offer below the strictly 
rational offer of 225 (B’s dispute cost). Data are provided for all rounds, for the first 15 rounds of 
the game (R1-15), and the last 15 rounds of the game (R16-30). This separation in game halves 
allows for identification of any potential change in behavior once subjects accumulate 
experience. As shown in Table 4.2, over all rounds, B’s mean offer is 98, and B’s median offer is 
100, representing 22-25 of surplus (about 15% of the “pie”). A revealing AL has a mean offer of 
178 and a median offer of 200. The mean represents 46 units of surplus, while the median 
represents 25 units of surplus. Thus, in the signaling game, a revealing Player A’s mean offer is 
more generous than B’s mean offer in the screening game, while the median offers are equally 
generous, offering 25 units of surplus to the other player. There is no noticeable change in mean 
offer behavior between R1-15 and the R16-30.5 
Table 4.2. Summary Statistics on Theory Consistent Offers in the 75-225 Range in the One-
Sided Single-Offer Games 
 All Rounds  R1-15  R15-30 
Statistic B AL  B AL  B AL 
n 110 105  54 43  56 62 
Offer         
Mean 97.55 178.82  97.69 174.53  97.41 181.79 
(SD) (11.94) (43.28)  (15.47) (49.11)  (7.20) (38.86) 
Median 100 200  100 200  100 200 
Surplus         
Mean 22.5 46.18  22.69 50.47  22.41 43.21 
Median 25 25  25 25  25 25 
                                                 
5 Player AL’s mean offer very slightly increased by about 7 units between R1-15 and R16-30, but that increase is not 
statistically significant (two-tailed t-test p = .401).  
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Table 4.3 provides statistical tests on offers and surplus sizes made in the single-offer 
signaling and screening games. The observed mean difference in offers made by Players B and 
AL is about half of the predicted difference (81/150), and the observed median difference is two 
thirds of the predicted (100/150). Testing shows that these differences in mean and median are 
statistically different from the predicted difference of 150 at all conventional levels. The 
difference in the mean size of the surplus offered is also statistically significant at all 
conventional levels, but the median is not.6  
Table 4.3. Statistical Tests on Theory Consistent Offers in the 75-225 Range in the One-Sided 
Single-Offer Games 
 Predicted Diff. Observed Diff. Test Statistic p-value 
Offers     
Mean 150 81.27 t = 15.71a,c .000 
Median 150 100 z = 12.80b,c .000 
Surplus     
Mean 0 23.68 t = 5.41a,d .000 
Median 0 0 z = 3.63b,d .000 
a Difference-in-mean offer size with unequal variances. A Variance Ratio Test rejects the null that offers made by 
player B and AL have equal variance (p = .000). 
b Wilcoxon Ranksum Test. 
c Hypothesis: Difference ≠ 150. 
d Hypothesis: Difference ≠ 0. 
 
Figure 4.1 shows the distributions of the surplus offered by players B and AL in the 75-
225 range. Player B’s offers are clustered around small amounts of surplus (25 or less), while 
AL’s offers, while still concentrated on a small amount of surplus, still happen throughout the 
range. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test on offers made by B and revealing AL confirms that the two 
surplus offered distributions are different (p = .000). 
                                                 
6 Even if the median surplus offered by both B and AL is 25, a ranksum test rejects the null that they are equal. 
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Figure 4.1. Comparison of Surplus Offered by Player B in the Screening Game and Revealing 
Player AL in the Signaling Game 
  
4.1.2. Offers 375-525 in the One-Sided Single-Offer Games 
 Table 4.4 provides summary statistics of the mean and median offers made in the offer 
range 375-525. Like the previous section, the data are provided for all rounds, and the two halves 
of the game individually. Player B, for the parameters in this study and under the theory 
discussed earlier, is not predicted to make offers in this range. Therefore, theory-consistent offers 
for this game appear only in the signaling game. Player AH and bluffing AL make offers in this 
interval. In the semi-pooling equilibrium, players are predicted to pool on a single offer. For this 
offer interval, surplus comparisons between AH and a bluffing AL are not well-defined, because 
there is no unique point prediction in the semi-pooling offer between those two players from 
which to base surplus calculations.  Empirically, bluffing AL and AH fail to coordinate and pool 
on a single offer. AL’s mean offer is 415, and her median offer is 375. AH’s mean offer is 450, 
and her median offer is 450. Thus, AL’s mean and median offer are lower than than AH’s. When 
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comparing between R1-15 and R16-30, AL’s mean and median offer increased in later rounds, 
while AH’s mean offer decreased, and her median offer did not change.7 
Table 4.4. Summary Statistics on Theory Consistent Offers in the 375-525 Range in the 
Single-Offer Signaling Game 
 All Rounds  R1-15  R15-30 
Statistic AL AH  AL AH  AL AH 
n 17 30  13 11  4 19 
Offer         
Mean 415.29 449.83  410.38 463.64  431.25 441.84 
(SD) (51.1) (40.48)  (54.94) (43.82)  (37.50) (37.28) 
Median 375 450  375 450  450 450 
 
 Table 4.5 provides statistical tests on offers in the signaling game. The observed mean 
difference in offers made by Players AL and AH is about 34.5, while they are theoretically 
supposed to pool on the same offer. Testing both the mean and median difference shows that 
those differences in offers are significant at the 5%, but barely not at the 1% level (p-values for 
the mean and median tests are .0141 and .0144 respectively).  
Table 4.5. Statistical Tests on Theory Consistent Offers in the 375-525 Range in the Single-
Offer Signaling Game 
 Predicted Diff. Observed Diff. Test Statistic p-value 
Mean 0 34.54 t = 2.55a .014 
Median 0 75 z = 2.45b .014 
a Difference-in-mean offer size with equal variances. A Variance Ratio Test does not reject the null that offers 
made by players AL and AH have equal variance (p = .268). 
b Wilcoxon Ranksum Test. 
 
 Figure 4.2 shows the distributions of the offers by Players AL and AH. Player AL’s offers 
are clustered around small amounts of surplus (skewed right, 59% of all bluffs are in the 375-400 
range), while AH makes offers throughout the range. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test on offers made 
                                                 
7 AL’s mean increase is not statistically significant (two-tailed t-test p = .493). AH’s mean decrease also not 
significant (two-tailed t-test p = .159). 
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by AH and bluffing AL reveals that the two offer distributions are different (p = .001). Thus, AH 
and bluffing AL exhibit different offer behavior.  
 
Figure 4.2. Comparison of Offers Made by Bluffing Player AL and Player AH in the Signaling 
Game 
 
4.2. Disputes in the One-Sided Single-Offer Games 
Table 4.6 reports dispute rates between players AL and B in both games. For both of 
those games, and for offers 75-225, the theoretically predicted dispute rate is 0%. However, the 
observed dispute rate is 27% for the screening game and 9% for the signaling game over that 
interval. Those excess disputes occur mostly on offers containing small amounts of surplus. This 
implies that the receiving player has an implicit demand for at least some surplus in order to 
settle. For offers 75-225, the dispute rate increases in later rounds of the screening game and 
decreases in later rounds of the signaling game. In the screening game, the dispute rate increased 
from 18% in R1-15 to 36% in R16-30. From Table 4.2, the mean 75-225 offer in R1-15 was 
99.25 and 97.4 in R16-30. It seems that while offer behavior is relatively consistent between the 
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two halves, Player A’s demarcation line seems to be shifting, as A implicitly demands more 
surplus to settle in the later rounds, resulting in more disputes. Oppositely, over the same 
intervals in the signaling game, the dispute rate decreased from 19% to 2%. Again, from Table 
4.2, in R1-15 the mean offer is 174.53, and in R16-30 it is 181.79. Even though Player A is 
asking for slightly more surplus, Player B is more willing to settle. Finally, bluffing Player AL is 
rejected 71% of the time. In later rounds, there is a slight increase in the dispute rate (from 69% 
to 75%), which potentially explains the decrease in bluffs from 15% to 5%, as shown in Table 
4.1. This increase in the dispute rate is also correlated with the increased mean offer that bluffing 
AL makes in later rounds (431 in R16-30 versus 410 in R1-15, from Table 4.4). 
Table 4.6. AL v. B Dispute Rates in One-Sided Single-Offer Games 
Game 
Proportion (ratio) of AL Disputes in specified interval; bold face indicates offers 
which are consistent with theory 
Rounds All Offers <75 75-225 226-374 375-525 >525 
ScrS: B       
All 
0.26 
(24/92) 
1.00 
(1/1) 
0.27 
(23/85) 
0.00 
(0/2) 
0.00 
(0/4) 
-- 
R1-15 
0.18 
(8/44) 
1.00 
(1/1) 
0.18 
(7/40) 
0.00 
(0/2) 
0.00 
(0/1) 
-- 
R16-30 
0.33 
(16/48) 
-- 
0.36 
(16/45) 
-- 
0.00 
(0/3) 
-- 
SigS: AL       
All 
0.22 
(36/161) 
0.21 
(3/14) 
0.09 
(9/105) 
0.48 
(12/25) 
0.71 
(12/17) 
-- 
R1-15 
0.30 
(25/84) 
0.21 
(3/14) 
0.19 
(8/43) 
0.34 
(5/14) 
0.69 
(9/13) 
-- 
R16-30 
0.14 
(11/77) 
-- 
0.02 
(1/62) 
0.64 
(7/11) 
0.75 
(3/4) 
-- 
 
There is a noticeable deviation from strict rationality in offers 226-374 in the signaling 
game. A strictly rational Player B would know that a strictly rational AH would never make such 
an offer; therefore, any offers in that range are from AL and should be disputed. However, only 
48% of those offers are disputed by B. This dispute rate increases over time from 34% to 64%. A 
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similar finding was also reported by PVB (2018). As noted in Table 4.1, out of the 25 offers 
made by AL in the 226-374 range, 18 were made by a single subject and all 18 were in the range 
370-374. This player offers a few cents less than the dispute earnings of an AH. A strictly rational 
AH would never make such an offer, since she would rather dispute and receive 375. Whatever 
the origin of this strategy, it was typically successful as the overall rejection rate on these offers 
was only 33% compared to the theory prediction of 100%. In the first 15 rounds, the rejection 
rate for this player’s offers was only 20% and it increased to 50% in the latter 15 rounds. 
Table 4.7 reports dispute rates between players AH and B in both games. For the 
screening game, a strictly rational Player B always offers 75 and AH always disputes. The 
observed dispute rate over the 75-225 interval was indeed 100%. For the signaling game, there is 
no unique point prediction of the dispute rate for offers 375-525. PVB (2018) calculate that for 
these same parameters, the predicted dispute rate is between 50%-67%. In this study, B rejects 
90% of the offers in the 375-525 interval, which is higher than the 83% reported by PVB (2018). 
Table 4.7. AH v. B Dispute Rates in One-Sided Single-Offer Games 
Game 
Proportion (ratio) of AH Disputes in specified interval; bold face indicates offers 
which are consistent with theory 
Rounds All Offers <75 75-225 226-374 375-525 >525 
ScrS: B       
All 
0.96 
(27/28) 
-- 
1.00 
(25/25) 
1.00 
(1/1) 
0.50 
(1/2) 
-- 
R1-15 
1.00 
(16/16) 
-- 
1.00 
(14/14) 
1.00 
(1/1) 
1.00 
(1/1) 
-- 
R16-30 
0.92 
(11/12) 
-- 
1.00 
(11/11) 
-- 
0.00 
(0/1) 
-- 
SigS: AH       
All 
0.71 
(35/49) 
0.25 
(1/4) 
0.13 
(1/8) 
0.83 
(5/6) 
0.90 
(27/30) 
1.00 
(1/1) 
R1-15 
0.67 
(14/21) 
0.25 
(1/4) 
0.25 
(1/4) 
1.00 
(2/2) 
0.91 
(10/11) 
-- 
R16-30 
0.75 
(21/28) 
-- 
0.00 
(0/4) 
0.75 
(3/4) 
0.89 
(17/19) 
1.00 
(1/1) 
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For the same 375-525 interval B rejected only 71% of the time when faced with a 
bluffing AL. Player B is seemingly rejecting a higher percentage of truthful high claims than 
bluffs. However, this is explained by the size of the offer. As shown in Table 4.4 for offers 375-
525, the mean AL bluffing offer was 415.29, while the mean AH offer was 449.83. Player B 
rejects higher offers at a higher rate. Those results indicate that Player B is unable to separate 
between AL bluffs and AH offers. If player B could translate this difference, then it would be 
expected that the rejections rates would reverse: B would reject the lower, bluffing offers made 
by AL at a higher rate than he rejects the higher, separating offers made by AH. The combined 
dispute rate between Player B and Player A in the 375-525 offer interval is 83%8 for the 
multiple-offer signaling game. 
4.3. Offers and Disputes in the One-Sided Single-Offer Games 
Players in the embedded ultimatum game tend to reject offers that contain only a small 
amount of surplus. PVB (2018) reports that in the signaling game, AL revealing offers that give 
less than 1/6th of the surplus are rejected at a 13% rate, while offers that give more surplus are 
only rejected 3% of the time. To better study the effect of offer size on the dispute rate, all offers 
are transformed into “offers of surplus” to the other player. As an example, in the screening 
game, if Player B makes an offer of 140, he or she offers 140 – 75 = 65 units of surplus to Player 
A.9 Table 4.8 shows the offer frequency over selected surplus intervals and the associated dispute 
rate of those offers for the screening game, over the 75-225 offer interval10. Figure 4.3 presents a 
histogram of the data in Table 4.8. 
                                                 
8 From Table 4.4 and Table 4.5: B receives 17 offers from AL and 30 from AH. He disputes 12 and 27 of those, 
respectively. The combined dispute rate is 
12+27
17+30
= 0.83. 
9 In the case of a dispute, Player A gets 150 – 75 = 75. 
10 That is the only interval in which Player B’s offers are theory-consistent. 
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Table 4.8. Offer Frequency and Dispute Rates for the Screening Game in the 75-225 Range 
Surplus Offered No. of Offers Relative Offer Frequency Disputes Dispute Rate 
0-24 47 0.43 26 0.55 
25a 52 0.47 20 0.38 
26-50 8 0.07 2 0.25 
51-75 3 0.03 0 0.00 
76-100 0 0.00 0 -- 
101-125 0 0.00 0 -- 
126-150 0 0.00 0 -- 
Total 110 1.00 48 0.44 
a
 All bins are 25 units wide, apart from the “25” bin. This is because an offer of “100” is an offer of 25 units of 
surplus; subjects gravitate to the number 100 over all other numbers. 
 
The overall dispute rate in the 75-225 offer range in the Screening Game is 44%. The 
dispute rate decreases as the offer size increases. In the surplus range 0-24, the dispute rate is 
55%. For surplus offers equal to 25 it is 38%. Very few offers are made above that, and of those, 
offers 26-50 have a dispute rate of 25%, and all offers of 51 or more are accepted. Thus, a higher 
offer size (and thus more surplus offered) decreases disputes.  
 
Figure 4.3. Offer Frequency and Dispute Rates for the Screening Game in the 75-225 Range 
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 Table 4.9 and Figure 4.4 present surplus offer frequency and dispute rate for the signaling 
game when B receives an offer 75-225 from a revealing AL.
11 The overall dispute rate in this 
interval is 9%. There is no monotonic trend like the one observed in the screening game. The 
dispute rate is consistently low with small variation across intervals. The spike in the 76-100 
range is because there are only 3 offers in that range, and one is rejected.  
Table 4.9. AL Revealing (75-225) Offer Frequency and Dispute Rates for the Signaling Game 
Surplus Offered No. of Offers Relative Offer Frequency Disputes Dispute Rate 
0-24 33 0.31 4 0.12 
25a 30 0.29 2 0.07 
26-50 15 0.14 1 0.07 
51-75 7 0.07 0 0.00 
76-100 3 0.03 1 0.33 
101-125 8 0.08 0 0.00 
126-150 9 0.09 1 0.11 
Total 105 1.00 9 0.09 
a
 All bins are 25 units wide, apart from the “25” bin. This is because an offer of “200” is an offer of 25 units of 
surplus; subjects gravitate to the number 200 over all other numbers. 
 
 
Figure 4.4. AL Revealing Offer Frequency and Dispute Rates for the Signaling Game 
                                                 
11 A revealing AL makes an offer between 75-225. She offers 0 surplus if her offer is 225, and 150 units of surplus if 
her offer is 75. 
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 Table 4.10 and Figure 4.5 show the offer frequency and dispute rates for the signaling 
game in the 375-525 range, where B faces a bluffing AL or a separating AH. Since there is not a 
unique point prediction for which surplus can be calculated in the range of offers, the offer size is 
presented instead of the surplus size. The overall dispute rate in this interval is 83%. Again, there 
is no monotonic trend. The dispute rate is consistently high with small variation across intervals.  
Table 4.10. AL Bluffing and AH (375-525) Offer Frequency and Dispute Rates for the 
Signaling Game 
Offer No. of Offers Relative Offer Frequency Disputes Dispute Rate 
375-400 15 0.32 11 0.73 
401-425 7 0.15 7 1.00 
426-450 13a 0.28 11 0.85 
451-475 2b 0.04 1 0.50 
476-500 7c 0.15 6 0.86 
501-525 3 0.06 3 1.00 
Total 47 1.00 39 0.83 
a All 13 offers are 450. 
b Both offers are 475. 
c All 7 offers are 500. 
   
 
Figure 4.5. AL Bluffing and AH Offer Frequency and Dispute Rates for the Signaling Game 
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4.4. S-O Discussion 
 Overall, the findings in the One-Sided Single-Offer games echo the literature. Table 4.11 
compares the outcomes from this replication study to the literature. Results from this chapter of 
the study are denoted “AVS S-O” for “Single-Offer”. Overall, in the screening game, the 
replication results are close to the literature. Here, Player B offers a slightly smaller amount of 
surplus to Player A, which in turn is accompanied by a slightly higher dispute rate versus AL. 
The dispute rate versus AH is also in line with the literature. In the signaling game, Player AL 
offers a larger amount of surplus to B, almost double of the surplus offered in the literature. With 
offers containing more surplus, Player B rejects the offers less. Disputes versus AH are in line 
with the literature reported values. 
Table 4.11. Comparison of Selected Results including S-O 
Game: Measure 
PVB  
2018 
PVB 
2015 
PVB 
2019 
AVS 
S-O 
Screening:     
B: Mean Surplus 75-225 36.6 35.2 -- 22.50 
Dispute Rate AL v. B All Offers 0.16 0.20 -- 0.26 
Signaling:     
AL: Revealing Mean Surplus 75-225 21.4 -- 28.7 46.18 
AL: Mean Offer 375-525 417.5 -- 437.9 415.29 
AH: Mean Offer 375-525 454.9 -- 451.6 449.83 
Dispute Rate AL v. B All Offers 0.32 -- 0.31 0.22 
Dispute Rate AH v. B All Offers 0.73 -- 0.69 0.71 
  
Since the replication results fall in line with previously published research, it is concluded 
that the computerization of the game did not affect subject behavior. The next two chapters cover 
the novel treatments discussed earlier in this study: Chapter 5 discusses the one-sided multiple-
offer games, and Chapter 6 discusses the bilateral multiple-offer game. Chapter 7 offers a 
comparison of results across all game types.
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CHAPTER 5. ONE-SIDED MULTIPLE-OFFER GAMES 
 The next two games played are the one-sided multiple-offer games. The same 
computerized experiment from Chapter 4 is used, using the same parameters for the payoffs and 
fees, but now proposers can make multiple offers during a specific time period (30 seconds). The 
multiple-offer screening game allows Player B to make any amount of offers he or she wishes 
during that time, and Player A can accept the most recent offer received or wait for another offer. 
Player A has no direct way to communicate with Player B. She can only accept an offer or 
remain silent while waiting. If the time runs out, then the result is a dispute, where both players 
incur the fee of 75, and Player A receives 150 (if AL) or 450 (if AH) from Player B. Similarly, in 
the multiple-offer signaling game, Player A has 30 seconds to make as many offers as she 
wishes, and Player B can accept the latest pending offer, or remain silent and wait for another 
offer. 
5.1. Offers in the One-Sided Multiple-Offer Games 
 Table 5.1 outlines the distribution of the final offers made by proposers in the multiple-
offer screening and multiple-offer signaling games. There are 329 observations in the multiple-
offer signaling game and 330 observations in the multiple-offer screening game.12 
In the multiple-offer screening game, 59.1% (195/330) of all final offers happen in the 
75-225 interval. Compared to the 91.7% of offers in the single-offer game, Player B finds it more 
challenging to make an offer in the theory-predicted offer interval. There is a large amount 
                                                 
12 One subject did not submit an offer in the first round of the game. 
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(26.7%, 88/330) of offers that offer less than 75 to Player A, which A should never accept. The 
bulk of these anomalous offers are < 75. 
Table 5.1. Final Offer Distributions for the One-Sided Multiple-Offer Games 
Game: Player 
Percent (number) of final offers in specified interval; bold face indicates 
offers which are consistent with theory 
Rounds n <75 75-225 226-374 375-525 > 525 
ScrM: B       
All 330 26.7% (88) 59.1% (195) 6.4% (21) 7.6%   (25) 0.3% (1) 
R1-15 165 34.5% (57) 55.8%   (92) 6.7% (11) 3.0%     (5) -- 
R16-30 165 18.8% (31) 62.4% (103) 6.1% (10) 12.1% (20) 0.6% (1) 
SigM: AL       
All 232 13.8% (32) 53.9% (125) 17.7% (41) 14.2% (33) 0.4% (1) 
R1-15 116 18.1% (21) 52.6%   (61) 18.1% (21) 10.3% (12) 0.9% (1) 
R16-30 116 9.5%   (11) 55.2%   (64) 17.2% (20) 18.1% (21) -- 
SigM: AH       
All 97 17.5% (17) 18.6% (18) 14.4% (14) 41.2% (40) 8.2%   (8) 
R1-15 48a 25.0% (12) 22.9% (11) 10.4%   (5) 29.2% (14) 12.5% (6) 
R16-30 49 10.2%   (5) 14.3%   (7) 18.4%   (9) 53.1% (26) 4.1%   (2) 
a One subject did not submit any offers on Round 1. 
 
In the multiple-offer signaling game, 232 out of the 329 observations are for Player AL 
and 97 out of 329 for Player AH. Player AL reveals her type 53.9% (125/232) of the time by 
making an offer 75-225, and bluffs 14.2% (33/232) of the time by making an offer 375-525. In 
single-offer signaling game AL revealed 65.2% of the time and bluffed 10.6% of the time. Player 
AH makes an offer 375-525 41.2% (40/97) of the time. Her offer goes up from 29% to 53% from 
R1-15 to R16-30. Thus, 60.2% of A’s offers in the multiple-offer signaling game are in strictly 
rational intervals.13 For AL in the signaling game, about 30% of her offers are in intervals where 
she should not be making an offer: 14% of her offers are <75 and 18% are “between offers” 226-
374. 
                                                 
13 This contrasts with 72.3% in the single-offer game in Chapter 4. 
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In both games, there are anomalous offers not predicted by theory: 40.9% in the multiple-
offer screening game and 39.8% in the multiple-offer signaling game. Recall from earlier 
chapters that the higher amount of non-theory conforming offers in the signaling game was 
attributed to the more cognitively challenging nature of the signaling game. In the multiple-offer 
game, the apparent cognitive challenge of both games is similar. 
 Section 5.1.1 discusses offers made in the 75-225 range by Player B in the multiple-offer 
screening game and revealing Player AL in the multiple-offer signaling game. Section 5.1.2 
discusses offers made in the 375-535 range by bluffing AL and separating AH. 
5.1.1. Offers 75-225 in the One-Sided Multiple-Offer Games 
Table 5.2 provides summary statistics of the mean and median offers made in the offer 
range 75-225. For this offer interval, the amount of surplus offered can also be compared. Data 
are provided for all rounds, for the first 15 rounds of the game (R1-15), and the last 15 rounds of 
the game (R16-30). This separation in game halves allows for identification of any potential 
change in behavior once subjects accumulate experience. As shown in Table 5.2, over all rounds, 
B’s mean offer is about 126, and B’s median offer is 100, representing 51-25 of surplus (mean 
and median about one third and one sixth of the “pie”, respectively). A revealing AL has a mean 
offer of about 169 and a median offer of 200. The mean represents 56 units of surplus, while the 
median represents 25 units of surplus. Thus, in the multiple-offer signaling game, a revealing 
Player A’s mean offer is about the same as B’s mean offer in the screening game, while the 
median offers are also equal but less generous, offering 25 units of surplus to the other player. 
There is a slight change in mean offer behavior between R1-15 and R16-30. Player B’s mean 
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offer increases by almost 8, and his median offer increases by 10. Player AL’s mean offer 
increases by a larger amount, about 18, and her median offer increases by 20.14 
Table 5.2. Summary Statistics on Theory Consistent Offers in the 75-225 Range in the One-
Sided Multiple-Offer Games 
 All Rounds  R1-15  R15-30 
Statistic B AL  B AL  B AL 
n 195 125  92 61  130 64 
Final Offer         
Mean 125.64 168.53  121.66 159.18  129.18 177.44 
(SD) (48.65) (51.32)  (48.59) (52.58)  (48.68) (48.85) 
Median 100 200  100 180  110 200 
Surplus         
Mean 55.64 56.47  46.66 65.82  54.18 47.56 
Median 25 25  25 45  35 25 
 
Table 5.3 provides statistical tests on offers and surplus sizes made in the multiple-offer 
signaling and screening games. The observed mean difference in offers made by Players B and 
AL is about 29% the predicted difference (43/150), and the observed median difference is two 
thirds of the predicted (100/150). Testing shows that these differences in mean and median are 
statistically different from the predicted difference of 150 at all conventional levels. The 
difference in the mean and median surplus offered is not statistically significant at all 
conventional levels. Thus, in that offer interval, B and AL are equally generous to each other, but 
it is not an equitable outcome. 
  
                                                 
14 The increase in Player B’s mean offer is not statistically significant (two-tailed t-test p = .258). Player AL’s mean 
offer increase is significant at the 5% level (two-tailed t-test p = .046). 
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Table 5.3. Statistical Tests on Theory Consistent Final Offers in the 75-225 Range in the One-
Sided Multiple-Offer Games 
 Predicted Diff. Observed Diff. Test Statistic p-value 
Final Offers     
Mean 150 42.89 t = 18.81a,c .000 
Median 150 100 z = 15.09b,c .000 
Surplus     
Mean 0 0.83 t = 0.15a,d .884 
Median 0 0 z = 1.37b,d .172 
a Difference-in-mean offer size with equal variances. A Variance Ratio Test does not reject the null that offers 
made by players B and AL have equal variance (p = .503). 
b Wilcoxon Ranksum Test. 
c Hypothesis: Difference ≠ 150. 
d Hypothesis: Difference ≠ 0. 
 
Figure 5.1 shows the distributions of the surplus offered in final offers by players B and 
AL in the 75-225 range. Player B’s offers are slightly clustered around small amounts of surplus, 
but not as dramatically as in the single-offer game (recall Figure 4.1). AL makes offers 
throughout the range. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test on offers made by B and revealing AL does 
not reject the hypothesis that the two surplus offered distributions are the same (p = .263). 
 
Figure 5.1. Comparison of Surplus Offered by Player B in the Multiple-Offer Screening Game 
and Revealing Player AL in the Multiple-Offer Signaling Game 
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5.1.2. Offers 375-525 in the One-Sided Multiple-Offer Games 
Table 5.4 provides summary statistics of the mean and median offers made in the offer 
range 375-525. Like the previous section, the data are provided for all rounds, and the two halves 
of the game individually. Similar to Section 4.1.2 in the single-offer games, theory suggests that 
Player B does not make offers in that range, and that in the signaling game AH and bluffing AL 
will pool on a single offer. Empirically, they fail to coordinate and pool on a single offer. AL’s 
mean offer is 427, and her median offer is 400. AH’s mean offer is 458, and her median offer is 
460. Thus, AL’s offer is typically more generous than AH’s. When comparing between the first 
and the second half of the game, both players’ offers increased as time progressed from R1-15 to 
R16-30, albeit AL’s increase is almost five times larger (AL’s offer increased by 15, AH’s 
increased only by 3.5).15 
Table 5.4. Summary Statistics on Theory Consistent Final Offers in the 375-525 Range in the 
Multiple-Offer Signaling Game 
 All Rounds  R1-15  R15-30 
Statistic AL AH  AL AH  AL AH 
n 33 40  12 14  22 26 
Offer         
Mean 427.27 457.80  417.50 455.50  432.50 459.04 
(SD) (47.04) (49.48)  (42.24) (56.28)  (48.52) (46.55) 
Median 400 460  400 475  465 455 
 
Table 5.5 provides statistical tests on offers in the signaling game. The observed mean 
difference in offers made by Players AL and AH is about 30, while they were theoretically 
supposed to pool on the same offer. Testing both the mean and median difference shows that 
those differences in offers are significant at all conventional levels. 
                                                 
15 However, the increase in AL’s offer is not statistically significant (two-tailed t-test p = .375). The increase of 15 
units is still only 1/3rd of the standard deviation of 47. Likewise for AH’s increase (two-tailed t-test p = .832). 
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Table 5.5. Statistical Tests on Theory Consistent Final Offers in the 375-525 Range in the 
Multiple-Offer Signaling Game 
 Predicted Diff. Observed Diff. Test Statistic p-value 
Mean 0 30.53 t = 2.68a .009 
Median 0 60 z = 2.72b .007 
a Difference-in-mean offer size with equal variances. A Variance Ratio Test does not reject the null that offers 
made by players AL and AH have equal variance (p = .503). 
b Wilcoxon Ranksum Test. 
 
Figure 5.2 shows the distributions of the 375-525 offers by Players AL and AH. Player 
AL’s offers are clustered around small amounts of surplus (skewed right, 55% of all bluffs are in 
the 375-400 range), while AH makes offers throughout the range. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 
on offers made by AH and bluffing AL reveals that the two offer distributions are different at the 
10% level (p = .066). Figure 5.2 is roughly the same as Figure 4.2, the comparison of AH and 
bluffing AL in the single-offer signaling game. 
 
Figure 5.2. Comparison of Final Offers Made by Bluffing Player AL and Player AH in the 
Multiple-Offer Signaling Game 
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5.1.3. Number of Offers in the One-Sided Multiple-Offer Games 
 Given that multiple offers are allowed, the number of offers made by either player can be 
studied. In the multiple-offer screening game, Player B makes a total of 1832 offers across the 
330 rounds, which amounts to an average of 5.5 offers per round. His median number of offers 
per round is 4 and his mode is 3. In the multiple-offer signaling game, Player A makes a total of 
1337 offers across the 330 rounds, which amounts to an average of about 4.05 offers made by 
Player A per round. Her median number of offers is 3, and her mode is 1. 
 More specifically, for the interval 75-225 in the multiple-offer screening game, Player 
B’s average offer is 116, and his average final offer is 126, a difference of 10. For the same 
interval in the multiple-offer signaling game, Player AL’s average offer is 155, and her average 
final offer is 169, a difference of 14. Over the 75-225 interval, both players’ final offer is slightly 
higher than the average offer. Therefore, for offers 75-225, player B’s offer increases (and he 
offers more surplus to AL), while player AL’s offer increases (and therefore she offers less 
surplus to B). For the interval 375-525, Player AH’s average offer is 444, and her average final 
offer is 458, a difference of 14. Bluffing Player AL’s average offer is 418, and her average final 
offer is 427, a difference of 9. 
 Table 5.6 presents the number of times Players A and B made a given amount of offers 
during a single period. For example, the 11 Players B in the ScrM-1 and ScrM-2 sessions made 1 
offer per round in 44 rounds, and they made 2 offers per round in 38 rounds. Similarly, the 11 
Players A in the SigM-1 and SigM-2 sessions made 1 offer per round in 83 rounds, and 2 offers 
per round in 45 rounds. The relative frequency of those observations is also listed.  
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Table 5.6. Number and Relative Frequency of Offers Made per Round by Players B and A in 
the One-Sided Multiple-Offer Games 
Offers 
Per 
Round 
Number of Rounds 
Player B made the given 
amount of offers 
Relative 
Frequency 
Number of Rounds 
Player A made the given 
amount of offers 
Relative 
Frequency 
0 0 0.000 1 0.003 
1 44 0.133 83 0.252 
2 38 0.115 45 0.136 
3 62 0.188 61 0.185 
4 25 0.076 32 0.097 
5 30 0.091 38 0.115 
6 30 0.091 17 0.052 
7 19 0.058 18 0.055 
8 16 0.048 9 0.027 
9 15 0.045 7 0.021 
10 5 0.015 3 0.009 
> 10 46 0.139 16 0.048 
Total 330 1 330 1 
 
 Players B make use of the opportunity to make multiple offers in 87% (286/330) of the 
rounds. In 30% (100/330) of the rounds Players B makes two or three offers per round, and in 
47% (155/330) of the rounds he makes between two and five offers per round. Similarly, Player 
A makes more than one offers in 75% (246/330) of the rounds. In 32% (106/330) of the rounds 
Player A makes two or three offers per round, and in 53% (176/330) of the rounds she makes 
between two and five offers per round. However, making too many offers too quickly makes it 
more difficult for the responding player to react, as each new offer invalidates the previous one 
the proposing player made, and the receiving player has no time to respond.16 The data from 
Table 5.6 are presented as a histogram on Figure 5.3. The relationship between the number of 
offers per round and the dispute rate is analyzed in Section 5.3.1. 
                                                 
16 There were two Players B and one Player A who systematically made an abnormally large amount of offers per 
round, increasing the average amount of offers. When debriefing with one of those subjects, the subject indicated 
that they (mistakenly) thought they had to keep clicking the “Submit Offer” button to keep their offer current. 
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Figure 5.3. Number of Offers Made per Round by Players B and A in the One-Sided Multiple-
Offer Games 
  
5.2. Disputes in the One-Sided Multiple-Offer Games 
 Table 5.7 reports dispute rate between players AL and B in both games. For both of those 
games, and for offers 75-225, the predicted dispute rate is 0%. The observed dispute rate for that 
offer interval is 4% for the multiple-offer screening game, and 11% for the multiple-offer 
signaling game. Compared to the one-sided single-offer games on the 75-225 interval where the 
dispute rates were 27% and 9% respectively, it seems like the ability to make additional offers 
almost eliminates disputes in the screening game but does not change behavior in the signaling 
game. In the signaling game, bluffing Player AL is rejected 55% of the time. Comparing disputes 
across R1-15 and R16-30, Player B and revealing AL’s dispute rate does not change. However, 
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bluffing AL experiences an increase in disputes, from 42% in R1-15 to 62% in R16-30.
17 That 
increase in the dispute rate is correlated with the increased mean offer that bluffing AL makes in 
later rounds (432 in R16-30 versus 417 in R1-15, from Table 5.4). 
Table 5.7. AL v. B Dispute Rates in One-Sided Multiple-Offer Games 
Game: Player 
Proportion (ratio) of AL Disputes in specified interval; bold face indicates 
offers which are consistent with theory 
Rounds All Offers <75 75-225 226-374 375-525 >525 
ScrM: B       
All 
0.21 
(45/211) 
0.56 
(32/57) 
0.04 
(5/126) 
0.36 
(5/14) 
0.23 
(3/13) 
0.00 
(0/1) 
R1-15 
0.23 
(25/110) 
0.49 
(18/37) 
0.03 
(2/62) 
0.50 
(4/8) 
0.33 
(1/3) 
-- 
R16-30 
0.20 
(20/101) 
0.70 
(14/20) 
0.05 
(3/64) 
0.17 
(1/6) 
0.20 
(2/10) 
0.00 
(0/1) 
SigM: AL       
All 
0.24 
(55/232) 
0.00 
(0/32) 
0.11 
(14/125) 
0.54 
(22/41) 
0.55 
(18/33) 
1.00 
(1/1) 
R1-15 
0.22 
(25/116) 
0.00 
(0/21) 
0.13 
(8/61) 
0.52 
(11/21) 
0.42 
(5/12) 
1.00 
(1/1) 
R16-30 
0.26 
(30/116) 
0.00 
(0/11) 
0.09 
(6/64) 
0.55 
(11/20) 
0.62 
(13/21) 
-- 
 
There is a noticeable deviation from strict rationality in offers <75 in the screening game. 
Player A only rejects 56% of offers less than 75. She should reject all of those offers. Indeed, her 
rejection rate increases as she gains experience in R16-30 from 49% to 70%. There is also a 
deviation from theory in the 226-374 interval. In the multiple-offer signaling game, a strictly 
rational Player B would know that a strictly rational AH would never make such an offer. 
Therefore, any offers in that range are from AL and should be disputed. However, Player B’s 
rejection rate of those offers remains around 54% (52% in R1-15, 55% in R16-30). Since B is 
                                                 
17 However, a difference-in-proportions test does not reject the hypothesis that the two dispute rates are equal (two 
tailed z-test p =.267). There is a relatively small amount of observations (12 and 21 in R1-15 and R16-30, 
respectively). 
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accepting slightly less than half of those offers, Player AL’s non-theory-conforming behavior is 
reinforced. Similarly, in the multiple-offer screening game, a strictly rational AH would never 
accept such an offer, and that offer is more costly to B than making a screening offer of 225 to 
AL, so B would never make it. However, B sometimes makes a “between” offer between 226-
374. The dispute rate in those offers falls from 50% in R1-15 to 17% in R16-30 against AL. 
Table 5.8 reports dispute rates between players AH and B in both games. For the 
screening game, a rational offer of 75-225 (made by Player B) should always be disputed by 
Player AH. However, this happens only 52% of the time. In the single-offer games, that dispute 
rate was 100%. In the screening game, when Player AH makes an offer between 375-525, she 
gets rejected 50% of the time. This is substantially less than the 90% in the one-offer game, even 
if the typical offer is comparable. The same happens with a bluffing AL, whose rejection rate 
when she makes an offer 375-525 was 71% in the single-offer game, but only 55% in the 
multiple-offer game. Even though the average offer that AH makes is higher than the offer a 
bluffing AL makes, she gets rejected slightly less often than AL (50% rejection rate for AH, 55% 
for AL). The combined dispute rate between Player B and Player A in the 375-525 offer interval 
is 55%18 for the multiple-offer signaling game. 
  
                                                 
18 From Table 5.4 and Table 5.5: B receives 33 offers from AL and 40 from AH. He disputes 18 and 20 of those, 
respectively. The combined dispute rate is 
18+20
33+40
= 0.52. 
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Table 5.8. AH v. B Dispute Rates in One-Sided Multiple-Offer Games 
Game: Player 
Proportion (ratio) of AH Disputes in specified interval; bold face indicates 
offers which are consistent with theory 
Rounds All Offers <75 75-225 226-374 375-525 >525 
ScrM: B       
All 
0.53 
(63/119) 
0.58 
(18/31) 
0.52 
(36/69) 
0.57 
(4/7) 
0.42 
(5/12) 
-- 
R1-15 
0.44 
(24/55) 
0.45 
(9/20) 
0.50 
(15/30) 
0.00 
(0/3) 
0.00 
(0/2) 
-- 
R16-30 
0.61 
(39/64) 
0.82 
(9/11) 
0.54 
(21/39) 
1.00 
(4/4) 
0.50 
(5/10) 
-- 
SigM: AH       
All 
0.44 
(43/98) 
0.12 
(2/17) 
0.33 
(6/18) 
0.50 
(7/14) 
0.50 
(20/40) 
0.89 
(8/9) 
R1-15 
0.41 
(20/49) 
0.17 
(2/12) 
0.27 
(3/11) 
0.40 
(2/5) 
0.50 
(7/14) 
0.86 
(6/7) 
R16-30 
0.47 
(23/49) 
0.00 
(0/5) 
0.43 
(3/7) 
0.56 
(5/9) 
0.50 
(13/26) 
1.00 
(2/2) 
 
 
5.3. Offers and Disputes in the One-Sided Multiple-Offer Games 
 Like the discussion in Chapter 4 about offer size and dispute rates, the final offer is 
transformed into an “offer of surplus” to the other player when discussing offers in the 75-225 
interval. Then, the dispute rate can be studied as it changes across different levels of surplus 
offered. Table 5.9 shows the offer frequency over selected surplus intervals and the associated 
dispute rate of those offers for the screening game, over the 75-225 offer interval. Figure 5.4 
presents the data from Table 5.9 in histogram form. 
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Table 5.9. Final Offer Frequency and Dispute Rates for the Multiple-Offer Screening Game in 
the 75-225 Range 
Surplus Offered No. of Offers Relative Offer Frequency Disputes Dispute Rate 
0-24 70 0.36 20 0.29 
25a 33 0.17 6 0.18 
26-50 17 0.09 3 0.18 
51-75 19 0.10 2 0.11 
76-100 16 0.08 2 0.13 
101-125 24 0.12 5 0.21 
126-150 16 0.08 3 0.19 
Total 195 1.00 41 0.21 
a
 All bins are 25 units wide, apart from the “25” bin. This is because an offer of “100” is an offer of 25 units of 
surplus; subjects gravitate to the number 100 over all other numbers. 
 
The overall dispute rate in the 75-225 final offer range in the multiple-offer screening 
game is 21%. There is no clear pattern in the dispute rate. The dispute rate is slightly higher 
(29%) when Player B offers less than 25 units of surplus, which is less than 1/6th of the total 
surplus. At all other ranges, it is 21% or less. Compared to the single-offer game (Table 4.6) the 
offers are not as tightly packed on the lower end of the distribution. 
 
Figure 5.4. Offer Frequency and Dispute Rates for the Multiple-Offer Screening Game in the 
75-225 Range 
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Table 5.10 and Figure 5.5 present the offer frequency and dispute rate for the multiple-
offer signaling game when B receives an offer 75-225 from a revealing AL. The overall dispute 
rate is 11%. There is no single monotonic trend in the dispute rate. The dispute rate is the lowest 
at the lowest amount of surplus offered (Only 3% when there is less than 25 surplus offered). 
This is surprising, as it contrasts previous findings. B readily accepts offers that contain almost 
no surplus at all. 
Table 5.10. AL Revealing (75-225) Final Offer Frequency and Dispute Rates for the Multiple-
Offer Signaling Game 
Surplus Offered No. of Offers Relative Offer Frequency Disputes Dispute Rate 
0-24 35 0.28 1 0.03 
25a 30 0.24 4 0.13 
26-50 10 0.08 1 0.10 
51-75 10 0.08 2 0.20 
76-100 4 0.03 1 0.25 
101-125 17 0.14 3 0.18 
126-150 19 0.15 2 0.11 
Total 125 1.00 14 0.11 
a
 All bins are 25 units wide, apart from the “25” bin. This is because an offer of “200” is an offer of 25 units of 
surplus; subjects gravitate to the number 200 over all other numbers. 
 
 
Figure 5.5. AL Revealing Offer Frequency and Dispute Rates for the Multiple-Offer Signaling 
Game 
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Table 5.11 and Figure 5.6 show the offer frequency and dispute rates for the signaling 
game in the 375-525 range, where B faces a bluffing AL or a separating AH. Since there is not a 
unique point prediction for which surplus can be calculated in the range of offers, the offer size is 
presented instead of the surplus size. The overall dispute rate is 52%. There is no monotonic 
trend in the dispute rate. 
Table 5.11. AL Bluffing and AH (375-525) Final Offer Frequency and Dispute Rates for the 
Multiple-Offer Signaling Game 
Surplus Offered No. of Offers Relative Offer Frequency Disputes Dispute Rate 
375-400 28 0.38 12 0.43 
401-425 8 0.11 2 0.25 
426-450 6 0.08 5 0.83 
451-475 8 0.11 4 0.50 
476-500 12 0.16 8 0.67 
501-525 11 0.15 7 0.64 
Total 73 1.00 38 0.52 
 
 
 
Figure 5.6. AL Bluffing and AH Offer Frequency and Dispute Rates for the Multiple-Offer 
Signaling Game 
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5.3.1. Disputes and Number of Offers in One-Sided Multiple-Offer Games 
 In the multiple offer games, players generally take advantage of the ability to make more 
than one offer, as discussed in Section 5.1.3. As shown earlier in Table 5.6, Player B makes 
multiple offers in 87% of the rounds, and Player A makes multiple offers in 75% of the rounds. 
In this section, the relationship between the number of offers made per round and the dispute rate 
is investigated. Table 5.12 presents the offer per round data from Table 5.6 and the associated 
dispute rate for that given number of offers per round. For example, in the 44 rounds where 
Player B makes 1 offer per round, the observed dispute rate is 17%. Similarly, in the 83 rounds 
where Player A makes 1 offer per round, the observed dispute rate is 18%. 
Table 5.12. Dispute Rate According to Number of Offers Made per Round in the One-Sided 
Multiple-Offer Games 
Offers 
per 
Round 
Number of Rounds 
Player B made the given 
amount of offers 
B’s by-offer 
Dispute Rate 
Number of Rounds 
Player A made the given 
amount of offers 
A’s by-offer 
Dispute Rate 
1 44 0.17 83 0.18 
2 38 0.13 45 0.13 
3 62 0.28 61 0.24 
4 25 0.38 32 0.56 
5 30 0.34 38 0.23 
6 30 0.41 17 0.27 
7 19 0.56 18 0.42 
8 16 0.44 9 0.56 
9 15 0.57 7 0.27 
10 5 0.33 3 0.40 
> 10 46 0.56 16 0.61 
 
 These dispute rates are plotted on Figure 5.7. The lowest incidence of disputes occurs 
when two offers are made per round for either game. The dispute rate then follows a slightly 
increasing path. The dispute rate for both players moves in the same direction until 7 offers per 
round have been made. When Player A makes the offer, the dispute rate is more volatile than 
when Player B makes the offer. 
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Figure 5.7. Dispute Rate in Multiple-Offer Games by Player’s Per-Round Offers 
 
 The random-effects logit model 𝑅𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is constructed. In this model, 
Reject is the binary variable [0,1] indicating whether a dispute has happened, X is the number of 
offers per round, i is the individual subject ID, t is the round, α is the unobserved time-invariant 
individual subject effect, and u is the error term. The output of this regression is presented in 
Table 5.13. The regression yields a positive coefficient for β for both games, which generally 
confirms the idea that additional offers per round increase the likelihood of dispute.  
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Table 5.13. Random Effects Logit Regressions of Dispute on the Number of Offers in 
Multiple-Offer Games 
 Multiple-Offer Screening  Multiple-Offer Signaling 
 Estimated Coefficient 
(s.e.) 
Test Statistic 
(p-value) 
 
Estimated Coefficient 
(s.e.) 
Test Statistic 
(p-value) 
β1 
0.274 
(0.054) 
z = 4.51 
(.000) 
 
0.154 
(0.470) 
z = 3.28 
(.001) 
Constant 
–2.201 
(.425) 
z = –5.19 
(.000) 
 
-1.620 
(.331) 
z = –4.89 
(.000) 
      
n 330   330  
Wald χ2  
χ2 = 20.31 
(.000) 
  
χ2 = 10.76 
(.001) 
Likelihood 
Ratio ρ 
 
?̅?2 = 12.47 
(.000) 
  
?̅?2 = 11.04 
(.000) 
 
5.4. M-O Discussion 
 Overall, the findings in the One-Sided Multiple-Offer games are similar to the Single-
Offer games. Table 5.14 compares the outcomes of this set of games to the outcomes reported in 
the literature and the Single-Offer games from Chapter 4. Results from this chapter are denoted 
“AVS M-O”, for “Multiple Offer”. Two major differences show up, compared to the Single-
Offer games. First, in the screening game, multiple offers more than double the amount of 
surplus that Player B offers, on average, to Player A. Player A also offers slightly more surplus 
to Player B, but the increase is not as dramatic. Second, the dispute rate between AL and B seems 
largely unaffected in both games, but there is a large decrease in dispute rates between AH and B. 
It therefore seems that allowing for multiple offers makes players offer a higher amount of 
surplus, and it encourages settlement when the plaintiff has a high claim. Chapter 6 follows with 
a discussion of the bilateral multiple-offer game, where both players are now allowed to make 
offers to each other during the same period. 
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Table 5.14. Comparison of Selected Results Including M-O 
Game: Measure 
PVB  
2018 
PVB 
2015 
PVB 
2019 
AVS 
S-O 
AVS 
M-O 
Screening:      
B: Mean Surplus 75-225 36.6 35.2 -- 22.50 55.64 
Dispute Rate AL v. B All Offers 0.16 0.20 -- 0.26 0.21 
Signaling:      
AL: Revealing Mean Surplus 75-225 21.4 -- 28.7 46.18 56.47 
AL: Mean Offer 375-525 417.5 -- 437.9 415.29 427.27 
AH: Mean Offer 375-525 454.9 -- 451.6 449.83 457.80 
Dispute Rate AL v. B All Offers 0.32 -- 0.31 0.22 0.24 
Dispute Rate AH v. B All Offers 0.73 -- 0.69 0.71 0.44 
63 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 6. BILATERAL MULTIPLE-OFFER GAME 
The same experiment from the previous two chapters is used, using the same parameters 
and fees, but now both Player A and Player B can make multiple offers to each other during a 
specific time period (30 seconds). Thus, the Bilateral Multiple-Offer Game allows both players 
to make and amount of offers they wish, and either player can accept the most recent offer made 
by the other player. If either accepts an offer, the round ends for that pair, and the other player’s 
offer does not influence the payoff or cost.  Players are not allowed to exchange any other 
message than an offer; therefore, a player’s three possible responses to an offer are: 1) accept the 
offer, 2) remain silent and wait for another offer, 3) make a counteroffer. If the time runs out, 
then the result is a dispute. Both players incur the fee of 75, and Player A receives 150 (if AL) or 
450 (if AH) from Player B. Offers update in real time for both players, and they can see a history 
of the others’ offers for the round. This is a unified game, as there is no separate screening and 
signaling games. However, Player B’s behavior can be compared to his behavior in the screening 
game, and Player A’s behavior can be compared to her behavior in the signaling game. This 
chapter follows this convention, that Player B makes offers as if he is playing a screening game, 
and Player A makes offers as if she is playing a signaling game. 
6.1. Offers in the Bilateral Multiple-Offer Game 
 Table 6.1 presents the final offers made by proposers in the negotiation game. There are 
750 observations from Player B, and 750 from Player A. Out of those 750, 476 observations are 
made on Player AL, and 274 on Player AH. Players sometime send no offer at all, but simply 
respond to the offers made by the other player. 
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Table 6.1. Final Offer Distributions for the Bilateral Multiple-Offer Game 
Game: Player 
Percent (number) of offers in specified interval; bold face indicates offers 
which are consistent with theory 
Rounds n <75 75-225 226-374 375-525 > 525 No Offer 
BMO: B        
All 750 
21.9% 
(164) 
51.1% 
(383) 
15.1% 
(113) 
7.7% 
(58) 
0.1% 
(1) 
4.1% 
(31) 
R1-15 375 
30.4% 
(114) 
45.3% 
(170) 
11.7% 
(44) 
6.1% 
(23) 
0.3% 
(1) 
6.1% 
(23) 
R16-30 375 
13.3% 
(50) 
56.8% 
(213) 
18.4% 
(69) 
9.3% 
(35) 
-- 
2.1% 
(8) 
BMO: AL        
All 476 
14.3% 
(68) 
41.8% 
(199) 
14.5% 
(69) 
26.1% 
(124) 
1.3% 
(6) 
2.1% 
(10) 
R1-15 253 
19.4% 
(49) 
43.5% 
(110) 
12.6% 
(32) 
21.7% 
(55) 
0.4% 
(1) 
2.4% 
(6) 
R16-30 223 
8.5% 
(19) 
39.9% 
(89) 
16.6% 
(37) 
30.9% 
(69) 
2.2% 
(5) 
1.8% 
(4) 
BMO: AH        
All 274 
11.7% 
(32) 
20.1% 
(55) 
12.4% 
(34) 
49.3% 
(135) 
3.6% 
(10) 
2.9% 
(8) 
R1-15 122 
21.3% 
(26) 
23.0% 
(28) 
12.3% 
(15) 
36.1% 
(44) 
0.8% 
(1) 
6.6% 
(8) 
R16-30 152 
3.9% 
(6) 
17.8% 
(27) 
12.5% 
(19) 
59.9% 
(91) 
5.9% 
(9) 
-- 
 
 
 Player B makes an offer 75-225 51.1% (383/750) of the time. This is more similar to the 
multiple-offer screening game, where B made such an offer 59.1% of the time, than the single-
offer screening game, where he made such an offer 91.7% of the time. Like the multiple-offer 
screening game, Player B exhibits a relatively large amount of offers below 75, 21.9% (164/750). 
This amount decreases from 30.4% in R1-15 to 13.3% in R16-30. There are some “between” 
offers, in the 226-374 interval, 15.1% (113/750). This is higher than in the single-offer game 
(2.5%) and the multiple-offer game (6.4%). Those “between” offers increase in R16-30 to 
18.4%. Collectively, the number of anomalous offers is 48.9% for Player B. 
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 Player AL reveals her type only 41.8% (199/476) of the time by making an offer 75-225, 
and bluffs 26.1% (124/476) of the time by making an offer 375-525. Her bluffing rate is higher 
than in the one-sided multiple-offer signaling game (14.2%) and the single-offer signaling game 
(10.6%). Player AL makes offers consistent with theory 67.9% of the time. Player AH makes an 
offer 375-525 49.3% (135/274) of the time. Thus, 61.1% (458/750) of A’s offers are in strictly 
rational intervals. The number of anomalous offers is 38.9% for Player A. 
Both players show a higher propensity for making anomalous offers. This raises the issue 
that allowing for multiple offers makes subjects more likely to make an anomalous offer, 
regardless of who can make an offer. In later rounds (R15-16), all player types (B, AL, and AH) 
make anomalous offers at a smaller rate than in early rounds (R1-15). In more detail, AL’s 
probability of revealing decreases by 3.6% points, while her probability of bluffing increases by 
4.8% points. 
Section 6.1.1 discusses offers made in the 75-225 range by Player B and revealing AL in 
the bilateral multiple-offer game. Section 6.1.2 discusses offers made in the 375-525 range by 
bluffing AL and separating AH. 
6.1.1. Offers 75-225 in the Bilateral Multiple-Offer Game 
 Table 6.2 provides summary statistics of the mean and median offers made in the offer 
range 75-225. For this offer interval, the amount of surplus offered can also be compared. Data 
are provided for all rounds, for the first 15 rounds of the game (R1-15), and the last 15 rounds of 
the game (R16-30). As shown in Table 6.2 over all rounds, B’s mean offer is about 144, his and 
median offer is 150, representing about 69 and 75 units of surplus, respectively. This is almost 
half the surplus at the mean, and exactly half the surplus at the median. Similarly, revealing AL 
makes a mean offer of about 153, and a mean offer of 155, which is about 72 and 70 units of 
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surplus, respectively. Similar to B, AL offers almost half the surplus. On average, both players 
are almost as generous to each other. This is strong evidence that a bilateral negotiation 
mechanism leads to an almost completely equitable outcome. Comparing when R1-15 and R16-
30, Player B’s behavior does not change essentially at all (a change in mean offer equal to 0.2), 
while Player AL becomes slightly less generous in R16-30 by offering about 13 less surplus.
19 
Table 6.2. Summary Statistics on Final Offers in the 75-225 Range in the Bilateral Multiple-
Offer Game 
 All Rounds  R1-15  R15-30 
Statistic B AL  B AL  B AL 
n 383 199  170 110  213 89 
Final Offer         
Mean 144.14 153.36  144.25 147.38  144.05 160.74 
(SD) (46.65) (47.50)  (48.38) (50.42)  (45.33) (42.77) 
Median 150 155  150 150  150 170 
Surplus         
Mean 69.14 71.64  69.25 77.62  69.05 64.26 
Median 75 70  75 75  75 55 
 
 Table 6.3 provides statistical tests on offers and surplus sizes made in the bilateral 
multiple-offer game. The observed mean difference in offers made by Players B and AL is about 
9. As there is no theoretical framework for the bilateral multiple-offer game, there is no predicted 
offer difference to compare the two players. However, testing that their offers are equal reveals 
that Player B and AL mean and median offers are different at the 5% level but not the 1% level. 
Testing the surplus offered by either player rejects the hypothesis that they are offering different 
surplus at all conventional levels. 
 
  
                                                 
19 Player AL’s mean offer decrease is significant at the 5% level (one-tailed t-test p = .048). 
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Table 6.3. Statistical Tests on Final Offers in the 75-225 Range in the 
Bilateral Multiple-Offer Game 
 Observed Diff. Test Statistic p-value 
Final Offers    
Mean 9.22 t = 2.25a .025 
Median 5 z = 2.28b .029 
Surplus    
Mean 2.5 t = 0.61a .543 
Median 5 z = 1.14b .252 
a Difference-in-mean offer size with equal variances. 
b Wilcoxon Ranksum Test. 
 
 Figure 6.1 shows the distributions of the surplus offered in final offers by players B and 
AL in the 75-225 range. Compared to the one-sided games, both players have a slightly more 
uniform distribution in their offers, especially B, who does not skew right as he does in the one-
sided games. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test on offers made by B and revealing AL reports that the 
two surplus offered distributions are not different (p = .341). 
 
Figure 6.1. Comparison of Surplus Offered by Player B and Revealing Player AL in the 
Bilateral Multiple-Offer Game 
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6.1.2 Offers 375-525 in the Bilateral Multiple-Offer Game 
 Table 6.4 provides summary statistics of the mean and median offers made in the offer 
range 375-525. Like the previous section, the data are provided for all rounds, and the two halves 
of the game individually. In contrast with the one-sided games, there is a situation where Player 
B might make an offer in this range. If B has a reason to suspect that an offer 375-525 he 
receives is from AH, B might counteroffer with a lower offer in the 375-525 range. Because of 
that, and in contrast with previous chapters, Player B’s offers will be included in the analysis of 
offers 375-525. Nevertheless, Player B faces a risk of encountering a bluffing AL, who has the 
incentive to accept such an offer. In either case, B only makes 7.7% of his offers in the 375-525 
range (see Table 6.1). 
Table 6.4. Summary Statistics on Final Offers in the 375-525 Range in the Bilateral Multiple-
Offer Game 
 All Rounds  R1-15  R15-30 
Statistic AL AH B  AL AH B  AL AH B 
n 124 135 58  55 44 23  69 91 38 
Final Offer            
Mean 440.33 434.08 415.14  441.33 436.55 424.57  439.54 432.89 409.55 
(SD) (46.12) (47.87) (35.80)  (46.14) (51.15) (40.17)  (46.42) (46.45) (31.54) 
Median 450 425 400  450 442.50 420  450 425 400 
 
 Empirically, AL and AH make a mean offer of 440 and 434, which brings them much 
closer than in the one sided games. The difference in their mean is only 7 units. In the single-
offer signaling game it was 35, and in the multiple-offer signaling game it was 31. The median 
difference in their offers is 25. The mean difference does not significantly vary between R1-15 
and R16-30. Player B makes a mean offer of 415 (decreases from 425 in R1-15 to 410 in R16-
30), and his median offer is 400. 
 Table 6.5 provides statistical tests on offers in the 375-525 range in the bilateral multiple-
offer game. The observed mean difference in offers made by Players AL and AH is 6.25, and it is 
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not statistically different from 0 at all conventional levels. The median difference of 25 is also 
not significant. These results imply that the multiple-offer bilateral negotiation mechanism 
allows bluffing AL and AH to become similar, something they were unable to do in one-sided 
games. 
 Player B makes offers that are different than the offers either type of Player A makes 
when comparing the means. When comparing medians, Player B’s median offer is different than 
AL at the 1% level, but only at the 5% when against Player AH. 
Table 6.5. Statistical Tests on Theory Consistent Final Offers 
 Observed Diff. Test Statistic p-value 
AL v. AH 375-525    
Mean 6.25 t = 1.07a .287 
Median 25 z = 0.74b .458 
AL v. B 375-525    
Mean 25.19 t = 4.02c .000 
Median 50 z = 3.29b .001 
AH v. B 375-525    
Mean 18.94 t = 3.03c .003 
Median 25 z = 2.26b .024 
a Difference-in-mean offer size with equal variances. A Variance Ratio Test does not 
reject the null that offers made by players AL and AH have equal variance (p = .676). 
b Wilcoxon Ranksum Test. 
c Difference-in-mean offer size with unequal variances. A Variance Ratio Test rejects the 
null that offers made by players B and AL have equal variance (p = .037). Similar for B 
and AH (p = .014). 
 
 Figure 6.2 shows the distributions of the 375-525 offers made by Players B, AL, and AH. 
Player B’s offers are clustered in the 375-400 range, with 60% of his offers being 400 or less. 
Player AL and Player AH have much more similar distributions. They too have a large cluster at 
375-400, but there are other offers dispersed among the other ranges as well. Kolmogorov-
Smirnov tests report that B and AH offer distributions are different at the 5% level (p = .032), B 
and AL offer distributions are different at all levels (p = .001), and that AH and bluffing AL offer 
distributions are not different at all significance levels (p = .458). Not only do bluffing AL and 
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AH have essentially the same mean and median offer, but their offer distributions are nearly 
identical. 
 
Figure 6.2. Comparison of Offers 375-525 by Player B, Bluffing Player AL, and Player AH in 
the Bilateral Multiple-Offer Game 
 
6.1.3. Number of Offers in the Bilateral Multiple-Offer Game 
 Given that multiple offers are allowed, the number of offers made by either player can be 
studied. In the bilateral multiple-offer game, Player B makes a total of 2296 offers across the 750 
rounds, which amounts to an average of about 3.06 offers made by Player B per round. His 
median and mode are both 3 offers per round. Player A makes a total of 2522 offers across the 
750 rounds, which amounts to an average of about 3.36 offers made by Player A per round. Her 
median and her mode number of offers is 3. 
 For the interval 75-225 in the bilateral multiple-offer game, Player B’s average offer is 
148, and his average final offer is 144, a difference of –4. For the same offer interval, Player 
AL’s average offer is 158, and her average final offer is 153, a difference of –5. For the interval 
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375-525, Player AH’s average offer is 430, and her average final offer is 434, a difference of 4. 
Bluffing Player AL’s average offer is 435, and her average final offer is 440, a difference of 5. 
 Table 6.6 presents the number of rounds subjects made a given amount of offers during a 
single period. For example, Player B in the BMO-1, BMO-2, BMO-3, and BMO-4 sessions 
made 1 offer per round in 128 rounds, and he made 2 offers per round in 135 rounds. Similarly, 
Player A in the same sessions made 1 offer per round in 136 rounds and 2 offers per round in 133 
rounds. The relative frequency of those observations is also listed. These data are presented as a 
histogram on Figure 6.3. 
Table 6.6. Number and Relative Frequency of Offers Made per Round by Players B and A in 
the BMO Game 
Offers 
Per 
Round 
Number of Rounds 
Player B made the given 
amount of offers 
Relative 
Frequency 
Number of Rounds 
Player A made the given 
amount of offers 
Relative 
Frequency 
0 31 0.041 18 0.024 
1 128 0.178 136 0.186 
2 135 0.188 133 0.182 
3 201 0.280 178 0.243 
4 117 0.163 119 0.163 
5 65 0.090 75 0.102 
6 33 0.046 33 0.045 
7 23 0.032 21 0.029 
8 9 0.013 6 0.008 
9 4 0.006 8 0.011 
10 1 0.001 6 0.008 
> 10 3 0.004 17 0.023 
Total 750 1 750 1 
 
Player B makes use of the opportunity to make multiple offers in 79% (591/750) of the 
rounds. In 45% (336/750) of the rounds Player B makes two or three offers per round, and in 
69% (518/750) of the rounds he makes between two and five offers per round. Similarly, Player 
A makes use of that opportunity in 79% (596/750) of the rounds. In 42% (311/750) of the rounds 
she makes two or three offers per round, and in 67% (505/750) of the rounds she makes between 
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two and five offers per round. The offer distributions look very similar. The relationship between 
the number of offers per round and the dispute rate is analyzed in Section 6.3.1. As in the one-
sided multiple-offer games, making many offers makes it more difficult for the responding 
player to react, as each new offer invalidates the previous one the proposing player made.   
 
Figure 6.3. Number of Offers Made per Round by Players B and A in the BMO Game 
  
6.2. Disputes in the Bilateral Multiple-Offer Game 
Table 6.7 reports dispute rates between players A and B in the bilateral multiple-offer 
game as a comprehensive overview of dispute rates in the bilateral multiple-offer game. The 
overall dispute rate is 26%. Dispute rates are also shown for select rounds. For example, when B 
makes an offer 25-225, the dispute rate is 23%. As both players can make offers simultaneously, 
the dispute rate is calculated not only over the interval of one player’s offer, but over the joint 
interval of both players’ offers. When both players make an offer between 75-225, the dispute 
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rate is 15%. When B makes an offer 75-225 and A makes an offer 375-525, the dispute rate is 
42%. In a similar fashion, dispute rates for all possible combinations of offer intervals are 
calculated. For purposes of comparison with the one-sided games, this table will be constructed 
separately for Players B, AL, and AH over specific offer intervals. 
Table 6.7. A v. B Dispute Rates Across all Offer Intervals in the Bilateral Multiple-Offer 
Game  
A’s Offer 
B’s Offer All Offers < 75 75-225 226-374 375-525 > 525 No Offer 
All Offers 
0.26 
(192/750) 
0.17 
(17/100) 
0.19 
(47/254) 
0.21 
(22/103) 
0.37 
(95/259) 
0.32 
(11/34) 
0.17 
(3/18) 
< 75 
0.33 
(54/164) 
0.20 
(15/76) 
0.33 
(18/54) 
0.67 
(2/3) 
0.59 
(16/27) 
0.75 
(3/4) 
0.00 
(0/1) 
75-225 
0.23 
(90/383) 
0.00 
(0/11) 
0.15 
(28/186) 
0.26 
(17/66) 
0.42 
(43/103) 
0.12 
(2/17) 
0.00 
(0/13) 
226-374 
0.28 
(32/113) 
0.00 
(0/1) 
0.00 
(0/2) 
0.06 
(2/32) 
0.39 
(29/75) 
0.33 
(1/3) 
0.50 
(1/2) 
375-525 
0.19 
(11/58) 
-- -- 
1.00 
(1/1) 
0.14 
(7/49) 
0.38 
(3/8) 
-- 
> 525 
0.16 
(5/32) 
0.17 
(2/12) 
0.08 
(1/12) 
0.00 
(0/1) 
0.00 
(0/5) 
1.00 
(2/2) 
1.00 
(/2) 
No Offer 
0.16 
(5/31) 
0.17 
(2/12) 
0.08 
(1/12) 
0.00 
(0/1) 
0.00 
(0/4) 
1.00 
(2/2) 
1.00 
(2/2) 
 
   
6.2.1. Player B Makes a “Screening Offer” 
When Player B makes an offer, he does not know if his opponent is AH or AL. Table 6.8 
shows the AL v. B dispute rate when B makes a final offer 75-225, across only AL’s offers. This 
dispute rate can be compared with the AL v. B dispute rate in the one-sided signaling game, 
where B makes an offer 75-225 against player A. Subcategories of AL’s final offer are also 
provided. There is relatively little movement between R1-15 and R16-30. When B makes a final 
offer 75-225 against AL, his dispute rate is 16%. When both players make a final offer 75-225, 
the dispute rate is 17%. When B makes a final offer 75-225 and AL makes a final offer 375-525, 
the dispute rate is also 17%. This low dispute rate seems exceptional given B’s dispute rate on 
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offers 375-525 in one-sided games is much higher (71% and 55% in the single- and multiple-
offer signaling games, respectively). This is because even though AL is bluffing, she accepts B’s 
75-225 offer 33 times.  
Out of the 48 negotiations where AL bluffs, B and AL end up disputing only eight times 
and settle in the other 40. Out of those 40 settlements, 33 settlements occur when Player AL 
accepts B’s screening offer, and seven when B accepts AL’s bluffing offer. So, out of 48 
negotiations where B is acting like a “screening” player and AL is bluffing, AL gives up the bluff 
69% of the time, B accepts the bluff 15% of the time, and they dispute 17% of the time. 
Table 6.8. AL v. B Dispute Rates for Selected Offer Intervals in the Bilateral Multiple-Offer 
Game when B Offers 75-225  
Proportion (ratio) of Disputes in specified AL offer interval; bold face indicates 
offers which are consistent with one-sided theory 
Rounds All Offers < 75 75-225 226-374 375-525 > 525 
All 
0.16 
(42/257) 
0.00 
(0/9) 
0.17 
(25/151) 
0.21 
(9/42) 
0.17 
(8/48) 
0.00 
(0/7) 
R1-15 
0.15 
(19/126) 
0.00 
(0/5) 
0.14 
(11/79) 
0.20 
(4/20) 
0.21 
(4/19) 
0.00 
(0/3) 
R16-30 
0.18 
(23/131) 
0.00 
(0/4) 
0.19 
(14/72) 
0.23 
(5/22) 
0.14 
(4/29) 
0.00 
(0/4) 
 
Table 6.9 shows the dispute rates when B makes a final offer 75-225 to AH. The dispute 
rate of B v. AH regardless of AH’s final offer is 38%. Out of the 55 negotiations where B is acting 
like a “screening” player, and AH is making a 375-525 final offer, they dispute 35 and settle 20 
times. When they settle, AH accepts the 75-225 offer six times, and B accepts the 375-525 offer 
14 times. So, the dispute rate is 64%, A settles for a low offer 11% of the time (even though she 
should never accept such an offer), and B settles 26% of the time. In R1-16 the dispute rate for 
AH final offers 375-525 is 80%, and it drops to 57% in R16-30. 
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Table 6.9. AH v. B Dispute Rates for Selected Offer Intervals in the Bilateral Multiple-Offer 
Game when B Offers 75-225  
Proportion (ratio) of Disputes in specified AH offer interval; bold face indicates 
offers which are consistent with one-sided theory 
Rounds All Offers < 75 75-225 226-374 375-525 > 525 
All 
0.38 
(48/126) 
0.00 
(0/2) 
0.09  
(3/35) 
0.33  
(8/24) 
0.64  
(35/55) 
0.20 
(2/10) 
R1-15 
0.39 
(17/44) 
-- 
0.17  
(2/12) 
0.30  
(3/10) 
0.80  
(12/15) 
0.00  
(0/7) 
R16-30 
0.38 
(31/82) 
0.00 
(0/2) 
0.04  
(1/23) 
0.36  
(5/14) 
0.57  
(23/40) 
0.67  
(2/3) 
 
Compare B’s settlement rate with AL and AH: he accepts AL’s bluff 15% of the time, and 
AH’s offer 26% of the time. This is a large difference (over 10%) even though B should not be 
able to tell between the two. The AL bluff and AH offer are not statistically different, as shown in 
Table 6.5. However, this comparison ignores AL’s increased willingness to settle when the bluff 
does not prove successful. If the negotiations where AL accepts B’s offer are taken away, then B 
faces a bluffing AL 15 times. Out of those 15, they dispute eight times, and B accepts the bluff 
seven times. Thus, when B offers 75-225 and AL does not give up her bluff, the dispute rate is 
53%. Similarly, when AH makes an offer 375-525 and B makes an offer 75-225, they meet 55 
times. Out of those 55, AH accepts the 75-225 offer six times. When AH does not accept B’s low 
offer, they face each other 49 times. Out of those, B accepts the high offer 14 times and they 
dispute 35 times. Their dispute rate is 71%. Therefore, the two-sided game is “good” for B, 
because AL gives up most bluffs, but does not help B when facing AH. 
6.2.2. Player A Makes an Offer 
 Player A has two intervals in which she makes a “theory-consistent” offer in the one-
sided games. If she is AL, she makes either a revealing offer of 75-225, or a bluff offer of 375-
525. If she is AH, she makes a separating offer of 375-525. Players also sometimes make 
“between offers”, in the range 226-374. Table 6.10 shows AL v. B dispute rates for all offers and 
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for selected intervals, for a revealing AL (final offer 75-225) and a bluffing AL (final offer 375-
525). makes an offer versus offers from Player B. The most important dispute rates to note are 
the dispute rates when AL makes an offer 75-225 or 375-525 against any offer from Player B: 
those are the equivalent to AL’s revealing and bluffing dispute rates in the one-sided signaling 
games. The two dispute rates are 20% and 16%, respectively. Notice that when B makes a 
screening final offer 75-225, the dispute rate against a revealing AL increases from R1-15 to 
R16-30 (14% to 19%). Similarly, when B makes an offer 75-225 and AL commits to her bluff 
(by making a final offer 375-525), the dispute rate decreases from 21% in R1-15 to 14% in R16-
30. Even if AL makes more bluffs during R16-30 (29 vs 19 bluffs), she gives up and accepts B’s 
offer 11 times in R1-15 and 22 times in R16-30. 
Table 6.10. AL v. B Dispute Rates Across Selected Offer Intervals in the Bilateral Multiple-
Offer Game 
 
Proportion (ratio) of Disputes in specified B offer interval; bold face indicates 
offers which are consistent with one-sided theory 
Rounds All Offers < 75 75-225 226-374 375-525 > 525 
AL: 
75 -225 
 
 
    
All 
0.20 
(39/199) 
0.38 
(14/37) 
0.17 
(25/151) 
0.00 
(0/2) 
-- 
0.00 
(0/9) 
R1-15 
0.19 
(21/110) 
0.40 
(10/25) 
0.14 
(11/79) 
-- -- 
0.00 
(0/6) 
R16-30 
0.20 
(18/89) 
0.33 
(4/12) 
0.19 
(14/72) 
0.00 
(0/2) 
-- 
0.00 
(0/3) 
       
AL: 
375 -525 
 
 
    
All 
0.16 
(20/124) 
0.38 
(3/8) 
0.17 
(8/48) 
0.20 
(6/30) 
0.08 
(3/36) 
0.00 
(0/2) 
R1-15 
0.16 
(9/55) 
0.00 
(0/2) 
0.21 
(4/19) 
0.33 
(5/15) 
0.00 
(0/17) 
0.00 
(0/2) 
R16-30 
0.16 
(11/69) 
0.50 
(3/6) 
0.14 
(4/29) 
0.07 
(1/15) 
0.16 
(3/19) 
-- 
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 Table 6.11 shows selected dispute rates when AH makes an offer versus offers from 
Player B. The most important dispute rate to note is the one where AH makes an offer 375-525 
against any offer from Player B: this is the equivalent to AH’s dispute rate in the one-sided 
signaling game and is 56%. 
Table 6.11. AH v. B Dispute Rates Across Selected Offer Intervals in the Bilateral Multiple-
Offer Game  
Proportion (ratio) of Disputes in specified B offer interval; bold face indicates offers 
which are consistent with one-sided theory 
Rounds All Offers < 75 75-225 226-374 375-525 > 525 
All 
0.56 
(75/135) 
0.68 
(13/19) 
0.64 
(35/55) 
0.51 
(23/45) 
0.31 
(4/13) 
0.00 
(0/3) 
R1-15 
0.57 
(25/44) 
0.90 
(9/10) 
0.80 
(12/15) 
0.33 
(4/12) 
0.00 
(0/5) 
0.00 
(0/2) 
R16-30 
0.55 
(50/91) 
0.44 
(4/9) 
0.57 
(23/40) 
0.58 
(19/33) 
0.50 
(4/8) 
0.00 
(0/1) 
 
6.3. Offers and Disputes in the Bilateral Multiple-Offer Game 
Like the discussions in Chapters 4 and 5 on offer size and dispute rates, the final offers 
each player makes is transformed into an “offer of surplus” to the other player. Then, the dispute 
rate can be studied as it changes across different levels of surplus offered. The major difference 
here is that the other player is also making an offer at the same time. Therefore, a truly complete 
histogram would need to be three dimensional, and instead of a dispute rate line, there would be 
a dispute rate surface. To avoid that, the following simplification is allowed: The first histogram 
shows the offer frequency and dispute rates as Player B’s offered surplus changes, considering 
only rounds in which B does not accept Player A’s offer. By discarding the rounds in which B 
accepts an offer, A’s settlement and dispute pattern can be studied. This creates a two-
dimensional histogram that can be compared to the screening games from previous chapters. 
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Similarly, to study A’s equivalent-to-signaling behavior, and B’s response to such offers, only 
the rounds in which A does not accept B’s offer are considered. 
Under this simplification, Table 6.12 shows B’s negotiation game equivalent-to-
screening offers 75-225, and A’s response to those offers. Figure 6.4 presents the table in 
histogram form. The overall dispute rate in the 75-225 final offer range is 36%. There is a slight 
variation, where the dispute rate is the highest when offers are low, and then it drops to about 
25%-34% (with one outlying exception when surplus offered is 126-150). Therefore, there is not 
a monotonic decrease in the dispute rate. 
Table 6.12. Offer Frequency and Dispute Rates for B’s Offers in the 75-225 Range in the 
Bilateral Multiple-Offer Game 
Surplus Offered No. of Offers Relative Offer Frequency Disputes Dispute Rate 
0-24 39 0.15 20 0.51 
25a 24 0.10 6 0.25 
26-50 22 0.09 7 0.32 
51-75 59 0.23 20 0.34 
76-100 29 0.12 8 0.28 
101-125 55 0.22 23 0.42 
126-150 24 0.10 6 0.25 
Total 252 1.00 90 0.36 
a
 All bins are 25 units wide, apart from the “25” bin. This is because an offer of “100” is an offer of 25 units of 
surplus; subjects gravitate to the number 100 over all other numbers. 
 
Compared to the one-offer screening game, B’s offers are more dispersed through the 
surplus interval. Recall that on Figure 4.3, a combined 93% of all surplus offered was between 0-
25. The overall dispute rate is slightly lower in the bilateral multiple-offer game (36% v. 44% in 
the single-offer screening game). The multiple-offer screening game offer distribution is more 
like the one in the BMO, but again, there is no large cluster of surplus offers in the lower bound 
as there was in the multiple offer game. The dispute rate is slightly higher in the bilateral 
multiple offer game (36% v. 21%). 
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Figure 6.4. Offer Frequency and Dispute Rates for B’s Offers in the 75-225 Range in the 
Bilateral Multiple-Offer Game, When B Does Not Accept A’s Offer 
 
Table 6.13 and Figure 6.5 present the offer frequency and dispute rate for the negotiation 
game when B receives an offer from a revealing AL, and AL does not accept one of B’s offers. 
The overall dispute rate is 28%. The dispute rate is higher over smaller surplus intervals (43% 
and 50% when surplus is 0-24 and 25, respectively), and then decreases to 13% to 28% over all 
other intervals. This is once again consistent with previous findings both by the literature and 
from games in preceding chapters that offers below 1/6th of the total surplus get rejected more 
often. Offer distributions are similar across the three games, with slightly less clustering around 
the lower surplus offers in the bilateral multiple-offer game. The dispute rate is lowest in the 
single-offer game, it is slightly higher in the multiple-offer game, and it is much larger in the 
bilateral multiple-offer game (9% v. 11% v. 28%). 
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Table 6.13. Offer Frequency and Dispute Rates for AL’s Offers in the 75-225 Range in the 
Bilateral Multiple-Offer Game 
Surplus Offered No. of Offers Relative Offer Frequency Disputes Dispute Rate 
0-24 14 0.10 6 0.43 
25a 20 0.14 10 0.50 
26-50 20 0.14 3 0.15 
51-75 24 0.17 6 0.25 
76-100 8 0.06 1 0.13 
101-125 29 0.21 7 0.24 
126-150 26 0.18 6 0.23 
Total 141 1.00 39 0.28 
a
 All bins are 25 units wide, apart from the “25” bin. This is because an offer of “200” is an offer of 25 units of 
surplus; subjects gravitate to the number 200 over other numbers. 
 
 
Figure 6.5. Offer Frequency and Dispute Rates for AL’s Offers in the 75-225 Range in the 
Bilateral Multiple-Offer Game when AL Does Not Accept B’s Offer 
 
Table 6.14 and Figure 6.6 show the offer frequency and dispute rates for the negotiation 
game, when A makes an offer in the 375-525 and does not accept one of B’s offers. The overall 
dispute rate is 57%. There is no pattern to the change in the dispute rate, as it increases and 
decreases across the surplus intervals without a monotonic pattern. The distribution looks very 
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similar to the ones in the single- and multiple-offer games. The dispute rate is slightly lower in 
the multiple-signaling game (52% v. 57% in the bilateral multiple-offer game). 
Table 6.14. Offer Frequency and Dispute Rates for A’s Offers in the 375-525 Range in the 
Bilateral Multiple-Offer Game 
Offer No. of Offers Relative Offer Frequency Disputes Dispute Rate 
375-400 70 0.42 44 0.63 
401-425 16 0.10 10 0.63 
426-450 33 0.20 14 0.42 
451-475 7 0.04 2 0.29 
476-500 28 0.17 17 0.61 
501-525 12 0.07 8 0.67 
Total 166 1.00 95 0.57 
a
 All bins are 25 units wide, apart from the “25” bin. This is because an offer of “200” is an offer of 25 units of 
surplus; subjects gravitate to the number 200 over other numbers. 
 
 
Figure 6.6. Offer Frequency and Dispute Rates for A’s Offers in the 375-525 Range in the 
Bilateral Multiple-Offer Game when A Does Not Accept B’s Offer 
 
 
6.3.1. Disputes and Number of Offers in the Bilateral Multiple-Offer Games 
 In the BMO game, players generally take advantage of the ability to make more than one 
offer, as discussed in Section 6.1.3. As shown earlier in Table 6.6, both Players A and B make 
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multiple offers in 79% of the rounds. Similar to Section 5.3.1 on the one-sided multiple-offer 
game, this section studies the relationship between the number of offers made per round and the 
dispute rate. Table 6.15 presents the offer per round data from Table 6.6 and the associated 
dispute rate for that number of offers per round. For example, in the 128 rounds where Player B 
makes 1 offer per round, the observed dispute rate is 15%. In the 136 rounds where Player A 
makes 1 offer per round, the observed dispute rate is 13%. 
Table 6.15. Dispute Rate According to Number of Offers Made per Round in the One-Sided 
Multiple-Offer Games 
Offers per 
Round 
Number of Rounds Player 
B made the given amount 
of offers 
Dispute 
Rate 
Number of Rounds Player 
A made the given amount 
of offers 
Dispute 
Rate 
0 31 0.16 18 0.16 
1 128 0.15 136 0.13 
2 135 0.17 133 0.20 
3 201 0.27 178 0.25 
4 117 0.32 119 0.31 
5 65 0.32 75 0.35 
6 33 0.55 33 0.33 
7 23 0.43 21 0.48 
8 9 0.11 6 0.33 
9 4 0.25 8 0.75 
10 1 1.00 6 0.33 
> 10 3 0.00 17 0.38 
 
 These dispute rates are plotted on Figure 6.7. The lowest incidence of disputes occurs 
when one offer is made per round for either player. Generally speaking, more offers per round is 
associated with higher dispute rates, as also observed in the one-sided multiple-offer games. The 
high volatility in the dispute rates when there are more than five offers per round is arguably 
because there is a limited number of observations in each case. As in the one-sided multiple-offer 
games, it should be noted that making many offers per round makes it mechanically difficult for 
the responder to accept an offer. 
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Figure 6.7. Dispute Rate in the Bilateral Multiple-Offer Game by Number of Offers per Round 
per Player 
  
Similar to the one-sided multiple-offer games the fixed-effects logit model 𝑅𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑡 =
𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is constructed for the bilateral negotiation game. The output of this regression is 
presented in Table 6.16. Evaluating a regression of the data yields a positive coefficient for β for 
both players combined, and for each player individually, which generally confirms the idea that 
additional offers per round increase the likelihood of dispute. 
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Table 6.16. Random Effects Logit Regressions of Dispute on the Number of Offers in the 
Bilateral Multiple-Offer Game 
 BMO: All Offers  BMO: Only A’s Offers  BMO: Only B’s Offers 
 Estimated 
Coefficient 
(s.e.) 
Test 
Statistic 
(p-value) 
 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
(s.e.) 
Test 
Statistic 
(p-value) 
 Estimated 
Coefficient 
(s.e.) 
Test 
Statistic 
(p-value) 
β1 
0.197 
(0.031) 
z = 6.39 
(.000) 
 
0.203 
(0.041) 
z = 4.90 
(.000) 
 0.205 
(0.048) 
z = 4.31 
(.000) 
Cons. 
-1.788 
(0.395) 
z = –12.41 
(.000) 
 
–1.871 
(0.220) 
z = –8.51 
(.000) 
 –1.751 
(0.192) 
z = –9.12 
(.000) 
         
n 1500   750   750  
Wald χ2  
χ2 = 40.79 
(.000) 
  
χ2 = 24.04 
(.000) 
  χ2 = 18.56 
(.000) 
L.Ra. ρ  
?̅?2 = 18.41 
(.000) 
  
?̅?2 = 17.54 
(.000) 
  ?̅?2 = 2.60 
(.054) 
a Likelihood Ratio 
 
6.4. BMO Discussion 
 Comparing the Negotiation game to the One-Sided games is not as direct as comparing 
One-Sided games to each other. However, equivalent measures of offers, surplus, and dispute 
rates can still be constructed. Table 6.17 shows this comparison. Results from this chapter are 
dubbed “AVS BMO”, for “Bilateral Multiple-Offer”. In the BMO game there is no difference 
between signaling and screening dispute rates when all offers are concerned, as both games 
happen simultaneously. For comparison with the one-sided games, the following convention is 
used: Player B exhibits “screening” behavior when he makes a final offer 75-225. Player A 
exhibits “signaling” behavior when she makes a final offer 75-225 (revealing), or 375-525 (bluff 
or separating). The more detailed dispute rates discussed earlier in Section 6.2 that address each 
player individually will be compared with earlier chapter results in more detail in Chapter 7. 
Overall, the bilateral multiple-offer game allows players in the 75-225 interval to share the 
surplus almost equally, as plaintiffs offer about 46% of the surplus (about 70). There is a slight 
decrease (from 21% to 18%) in the overall dispute rate between AL and B compared to the 
previous chapter in offers 75-225 as well as between AH and B in the 375-525 (44% to 39%). 
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Therefore, even bilateral negotiation significantly decreases AH dispute rates, while its effect on 
AL dispute rates is much smaller, compared to the one-sided single-offer game. Finally, an 
additional result is that Players AH and bluffing AL make similar offers when making an offer 
375-525, which is different than in previous mechanisms.  
Table 6.17. Comparison of Selected Results Including BMO 
Game: Measure 
PVB  
2018 
PVB 
2015 
PVB 
2019 
AVS 
S-O 
AVS 
M-O 
AVS 
BMO 
Screening:       
B: Mean Surplus 75-225 36.6 35.2 -- 22.50 55.64 69.14 
Dispute Rate AL v. B All Offers 0.16 0.20 -- 0.26 0.21 0.18 
Signaling:       
AL: Revealing Mean Surplus 75-225 21.4 -- 28.7 46.18 56.47 71.64 
AL: Mean Offer 375-525 417.5 -- 437.9 415.29 427.27 440.33 
AH: Mean Offer 375-525 454.9 -- 451.6 449.83 457.80 434.08 
Dispute Rate AL v. B All Offers 0.32 -- 0.31 0.22 0.24 0.18 
Dispute Rate AH v. B All Offers 0.73 -- 0.69 0.71 0.44 0.39 
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CHAPTER 7. DISCUSSION 
 Experimental results from this study show that allowing for multiple offers and 
counteroffers in the embedded ultimatum game has observable and significant effects in player 
behavior. Offer and dispute behavior is studied across five games: the one-sided single-offer 
signaling and screening games, the one-sided multiple-offer signaling and screening games, and 
the bilateral multiple-offer game. The results from those games are compared against each other 
in Section 7.1. Literature values are also presented for comparison. The research hypothesis is 
tested against these experimental data in Section 7.2. Section 7.3 provides concluding remarks. 
7.1. Comparative Statistics 
 Data on offer sizes and dispute behavior are collected across the five different games. 
Table 7.1 compares the subjects’ offer behavior. Allowing for multiple offers causes a noticeable 
difference in offer behavior. Turning the embedded ultimatum game into a multiple offer game 
decreases Player B’s screening offers, from about 92% to 59% in the multiple-offer game and 
then 51% in the bilateral multiple offer game. Further analysis of the data reveals some unusual 
behavior by Player B. He made 2.5% “between offers” 226-374, and 5% “high” offers 375-525 
in the single-offer screening game (theory says he should only make offers 75-225). Those 
percentages rise to 6.4% and 7.6%, respectively, in the multiple-offer screening game, and 
15.1% and 7.7% in the bilateral multiple-offer game. More surprisingly, B exhibits a large 
increase in offers less than 75, which a strictly rational Player B would never make – from 0.8% 
in the single-offer screening game, it rises to more than 20% in the other two games. The ability 
to make multiple offers works against Player B in that respect. 
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Table 7.1. Offer Percentages Comparison 
   Offer Percentage in each interval by Study 
Game 
Player(s) Offer Interval 
 PVB  
2018 
PVB 
2015 
PVB 
2019 
AVS 
S-O 
AVS 
M-O 
AVS 
BMO 
Screening         
B 75-225  87% 85% -- 91.7% 59.1% 51.1% 
Signaling         
AL Revealing 75-225  63% -- 64% 65.2% 53.9% 41.8% 
AL Bluffing 375-525  12% -- 15% 10.6% 14.2% 26.1% 
AH 375-525  91% -- 62% 61.2% 41.2% 49.3% 
 
 Player AL seems to be much less affected by the multiple-offer effect in her offer 
behavior. Both in the literature and in the AVS S-O games, she makes offers consistent with 
signaling behavior: about 75%-79% of her offers are in the combined intervals 75-225 and 375-
525. In the multiple-offer games, that percentage drops to about 68%, and the distribution across 
the two intervals shifts slightly. Her revealing 75-225 percentage drops from 65% to 54% in the 
one-sided multiple-offer game, and further to 42% in the bilateral multiple-offer game. Her 
bluffing 375-525 rate increases from 11% to 14% to 26%. Somewhat surprisingly, the relatively 
high percentage of bluffs in the bilateral game coincides with a lower (16%) AL dispute rate on 
those bluffs; this result is discussed below. Player AH makes a separating offer 375-525 about 
61% of the time in the single-offer screening game. This is consistent with PVB 2019, but not 
PVB 2018. AH’s separating offer rate drops to 41% when she can make multiple-offers, and 49% 
when bilateral multiple offers are allowed. 
 Table 7.2 compares the mean surplus that players offer each other in the 75-225 range, 
and the mean offers made by the two different types of Player A (AL and AH) in the 375-525 
range. For offers 75-225, in the single-offer games both B and AL offers average about 30 or less 
of surplus, which represents 20% or less of the 150 surplus from settlement (the AVS S-O 
signaling game is an exception at 46).  In the one-sided multi-offer game, both players offer an 
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average of about 56, or a little over a third of the surplus.  In the bilateral game, both means are 
about 70, or nearly half of the surplus. This finding potentially addresses “fairness” concerns. 
Over the 375-525 offer range, in the single-offer games Player AH makes higher mean offers 
than bluffing Player AL (a difference of 35, shown to be statistically significant in Table 4.5). 
However, in the BMO game, the two players not only have nearly the same mean (the two have 
the same median offer; see Table 6.5), but the distribution of their offers is also similar (see 
discussion above Figure 6.2). 
Table 7.2. Mean Surplus and Offer Comparison 
   Mean Surplus or Offer in each interval by Study 
Game 
Player(s) Offer Interval 
 PVB  
2018 
PVB 
2015 
PVB 
2019 
AVS 
S-O 
AVS 
M-O 
AVS 
BMO 
Screening         
B Surplus 75-225  36.6 35.2 -- 22.5 55.64 69.14 
Signaling         
AL Revealing Surplus 75-225  21.4 -- 28.7 46.18 56.47 71.64 
AL Bluffing Offer 375-525  417.5 -- 437.9 415.29 427.27 440.33 
AH Offer 375-525  454.9 -- 451.6 449.83 457.80 434.08 
 
 Table 7.3 presents dispute rates in the screening game (or when B exhibits screening 
behavior in the BMO). The dispute rate can be studied over specific relevant offer intervals, to 
exclude the effect of anomalous offers. However, the presence of anomalous offers is still an 
important consideration, and thus, “all offer” dispute rates are included in the table. Dispute rates 
for the BMO game had to be constructed carefully and considers the “asking player’s 
perspective”, since both players could make and accept an offer (see discussion in Section 6.2.1). 
In one-sided games, Player A is faced with B’s offer and accepts or rejects it. In the bilateral 
game, however, Player A can also make a counteroffer, which B may or may not accept. Player 
B also makes a large number of offers <75 in the multiple-offer games, which are mostly 
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disputed, and that inflates the overall dispute rate. Thus, the dispute rate under “screening” 
considers how does Player A react to offers by Player B in the 75-225 range. 
Table 7.3. Dispute Rate Comparison for Player B’s Screening Behavior 
   Dispute Rate in each interval by Study 
 
Player(s) 
Player B 
Offer Interval 
 PVB 
2018 
PVB 
2015 
AVS 
S-O 
AVS 
M-O 
AVS 
BMO 
B v. AL All Offers  0.16 0.20 0.26 0.21 0.16 
B v. AL 75-225  0.17 0.18 0.27 0.04 0.17 
B v. AH 75-225  0.98 0.98 1.00 0.52 0.64 
 
 The dispute rate between B v. AL over all offers is about 26% in the AVS single-offer 
screening game, 21% in the multiple offer game, and 16% in the bilateral multiple-offer game. 
However, PVB 2018 report overall dispute rates of 16% and 20% in their own single-offer 
screening games, so it is unclear if, and by how much, multiple offers can help overall 
settlement. For the 75-225 interval, the dispute rates are quite similar to those on all offers. A 
notable exception is the 4% dispute rate in the one-sided game multiple-offer game. This is very 
close to the 0% prediction. Somewhat surprisingly, the 75-225 dispute rate in the bilateral 
multiple-offer game is more in line with the one-sided games than the multiple-offer one-sided 
game. Lastly, Player AH disputes nearly all low screening offers in single-offer games. However, 
she disputes only 58% and 64% of those offers in the multiple-offer game. This puzzling result 
does not have a parsimonious explanation.20 
Table 7.4 reports dispute rates in the signaling game (or when A exhibits signaling 
behavior in the BMO). As in the previous table, dispute rates are shown for all offers and for 
selected intervals. 
                                                 
20 Subjects were not allowed to “speed up” the experiment by quickly settling on an unfavorable offer. They would 
still have to wait quietly for the 30 second negotiation period to expire, or until all other pairs in the round were 
done. Therefore, there is no apparent “time gain” for AH from settling when she should not. 
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Table 7.4. Dispute Rate Comparison for Player A’s Signaling Behavior 
 
  Dispute Rate in each interval by 
Study 
Game 
Player(s) 
Player A 
Offer Interval 
 PVB 
2018 
PVB 
2019 
AVS 
S-O 
AVS 
M-O 
AVS 
BMO 
AL v. B All Offers  0.16 0.31 0.22 0.24 0.18 
AL v. B 75-225  0.10 0.14 0.09 0.11 0.20 
AL v. B 375-525  0.85 0.71 0.71 0.55 0.16 
AH v. B All Offers  0.73 0.69 0.71 0.44 0.39 
AH v. B 375-525  0.73 0.73 0.90 0.50 0.56 
 
  Starting with Player AL, her overall dispute rate against B is 22%-24% in the AVS one-
sided games, and it decreases to 18% in the bilateral multiple-offer game. However, that 18% is 
not much lower than the PVB 2018 16% dispute rate. When AL makes a revealing offer 75-225, 
her dispute rate is 9%-11% in the AVS one-sided games, which is again comparable with the 
10%-14% in the literature, albeit a bit lower. In the BMO, this dispute rate jumps to 20%. This 
echoes the result from the screening game: the 75-225 dispute rate is higher in the BMO game 
than in the M-O game. In the AVS single-offer game, when AL bluffs, her 375-525 dispute rate 
is in line with the literature (71%). When multiple offers are allowed, her dispute rate falls to 
55%. It falls even further in the bilateral game, to 16%. Further analysis of the data reveals that 
124 of the final offers by AL were 375-525.  In 27 of those negotiations B accepted AL’s bluff, in 
77 AL accepted B’s counter-offer21, and in 20 (or 16%) a dispute occurred. The relatively low 
dispute rate on AL bluffs appears to be due to the fact the bilateral mechanism gives a bluffing 
AL an “out” if her bluff is not accepted, i.e., she can accept B’s counter-offer (assuming there is 
one) and earn more than her dispute payoff of 75. 
                                                 
21 In those 77 negotiations, 33 times AL accepts an offer 75-225, 19 times she accepts an offer 226-374, and 25 times 
she accepts an offer 375-525 that was lower than hers (in these 25 cases, AL’s mean bluff offer is 475 and B’s mean 
counteroffer is 420).  
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 Player AH dispute rate on all offers is 71% in the AVS one-sided single-offer game, 
which is in line with literature. Allowing for multiple offers has a large effect on her dispute rate: 
it drops to 44% in the multiple-offer game, and 39% in the bilateral multiple-offer game. A 
similar result is observed for AH offers 375-525, although the dispute rates are a little higher 
(90%, 50%, and 56%, respectively). The fact the single-game multiple-offer and bilateral 
multiple-offer AH dispute rates are similar suggests that the critical element is AH’s ability to 
make multiple offers, regardless of whether or not B can counter-offer. 
 A question that has not been asked so far is: Who gains the most when the dispute rate 
falls, Player A or Player B? The original motivation for this study was to identify a potentially 
more efficient negotiation mechanism that would reduce the incidence of disputes. This would in 
turn yield an opportunity for greater payoffs for Player A and lower costs for Player B. Table 7.5 
presents the per round mean payoff for Player A and per round mean cost for Player B in various 
studies of the one-sided single-offer games. The PVB literature values of the players’ per round 
payoffs and costs are reported where available. The AVS S-O game gives results that are largely 
in line with the previous literature, which is expected as the corresponding dispute rates are 
comparable (see above).22  
  
                                                 
22 In the screening game, Player A payoffs are roughly the same, except that AL makes a little bit less. Player B cost 
is about the same. In the signaling game, AH earns less, while AL earns about the same. Due care is needed when 
comparing payoffs and costs across games, however, because the differing ex-post probabilities of A being AL or AH 
can affect average outcomes. There were no PVB values for Player B’s cost to compare in the signaling game. 
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Table 7.5. Mean Player A Payoff and Mean Player B Cost Per Round 
 Screening  Signaling 
Player 
Negotiation 
PVB 2018 PVB 2015 AVS S-O  PVB 2018 PVB 2019 AVS S-O 
Player A Mean Payoff        
AL v. B 130 138 110  174 178 168 
AH v. B 371 371 376  386 390 328 
A v. B 208 197 173  243 214 205 
Player B Mean Cost        
AL v. B -- 168 150  -- -- 201 
AH v. B -- 517 521  -- -- 435 
A v. B -- 256 236  -- -- 256 
 
Table 7.6 provides a comparison between the AVS single-offer games and the multiple 
offer games. In the one-sided games (for which difference are reported), payoff and cost 
differences for AL v. B and A v. B are negligible. Larger differences – especially in the screening 
game – are observed for AH v. B.  In particular, AH’s payoff declines while B’s cost 
simultaneously declines. Thus the gains from the decline in AH dispute rates moving from the 
single- to multiple-offer games (see above) appear to be accruing almost exclusively to Player B. 
In the screening game, AH’s mean payoff declines by 104 while B’s mean cost declines by 170.  
In the signaling game, the declines are 23 and 65, respectively. In the bilateral multiple-offer 
game, the payoffs and costs are (roughly) comparable to the two-sided single-offer games. As 
with the dispute rates, the effect on payoffs and costs (particularly in the case of AH v. B) appears 
to be primarily due to the multi-offer aspect of the game, irrespective of whether the other side 
can make a counteroffer.  Moving from the single offer games to the multi-offer games, the 
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decline in the dispute rate increases the surplus from settlement available to AH and B.  However, 
it appears that most if not all this surplus is accrued by Player B. 23 
Table 7.6. Mean Player A Payoff and Mean Player B Cost Per Round (Difference from S-O) 
 Screening  Signaling 
 
Bilateral 
Player 
Negotiation 
AVS 
S-O 
AVS 
M-O Difference 
 
AVS 
S-O 
AVS 
M-O Difference 
 
AVS 
BMO 
Player A Mean Payoff        
 
 
AL v. B 110 125 +15  168 154 –14 
 
171 
AH v. B 376 272 –104  328 305 –23 
 
283 
A v. B 173 178 +5  205 199 –6  212 
Player B Mean Cost        
 
 
AL v. B 150 157 +7  201 190 –11 
 
198 
AH v. B 521 351 –170  435 370 –65 
 
342 
A v. B 236 227 –9  256 244 –12  250 
 
7.2. Research Hypothesis Analysis 
 As introduced in Chapter 3, there are three main hypotheses tested. H1 tests the multiple 
offer effect in one-sided games (single-offer v. multiple-offer). H2 tests the bilateral negotiation 
effect in multiple offer games (one-sided multiple-offer v. bilateral multiple offer). H3 tests the 
combined effect of both multiple offers and negotiation (one-sided single-offer v. bilateral 
multiple offer). 
 The H1 multiple offer effect can be tested when comparing the results from the one-sided 
single-offer and one-sided multiple offer games. Table 7.7 presents the relevant measures from 
only those two types of games and statistical comparisons. Offers and surplus sizes are compared 
                                                 
23 A contributing factor is AH’s apparent willingness to accept offers less than 375. As shown in Table 6.9, AH’s 
dispute rate when she makes offers less than 375 is only 18% (11/61). The data show that when B begins a bilateral 
negotiation round with an offer 75-225 (which appears to be acceptable to AL), Player AH sometimes counters with 
an offer way below than her dispute payout of 375. Out of the 61 rounds where this happened, Player AH accepted 
B’s offer 28 times, Player B accepted AH’s offer 22 times, and they disputed 11 times. 
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using difference-in-means t-tests. Dispute rates are compared using difference-in-proportion 
tests. 
Table 7.7. Testing the Multiple Offer Effect 
    Games  Tests 
Game 
Player(s) Measure 
Offer 
Interval 
 AVS 
S-O 
AVS 
M-O 
 Observed 
Difference 
Test 
Statistic p value 
Screening          
B 
Mean 
Surplus 
75-225  22.5 55.64  33.14 t = 9.41a .000 
B v. AL 
Dispute 
Rate 
All Offers  0.26 0.21  0.05 z = 0.96 .338 
B v. AL 
Dispute 
Rate 
75-225  0.27 0.04  0.23 z = 4.83 .000 
Signaling          
AL 
Mean 
Surplus 
75-225  46.18 56.47  10.19 t = 1.63b .105 
AL 
Mean 
Offer 
375-525  415.29 427.27  11.98 t = 0.83b .411 
AH 
Mean 
Offer 
375-525  449.83 457.80  7.97 t = 0.35b .724 
AL v. B 
Dispute 
Rate 
All Offers  0.22 0.24  0.02 z = 0.46 .644 
AL v. B 
Dispute 
Rate 
75-225  0.09 0.11  0.02 z = 0.50 .616 
AL v. B 
Dispute 
Rate 
375-525  0.71 0.55  0.16 z = 1.10 .273 
AH v. B 
Dispute 
Rate 
All Offers  0.71 0.44  0.27 z = 3.09 .002 
AH v. B 
Dispute 
Rate 
375-525  0.90 0.50  0.40 z = 3.53 .000 
a Difference-in-mean offer size with unequal variances. 
b Difference-in-mean offer size with equal variances. 
 
Testing the multiple offer effect gives the following results. In the screening game, the 
multiple offer mechanism statistically affects B’s mean surplus for offers 75-225, increasing it 
from 22.5 to 55.64. The multiple offer mechanism also significantly reduces the B V. AL 75-225 
dispute rate from 27% to 4%. In the signaling game, the mechanism does not affect revealing 
AL’s mean surplus offered75-225, nor AL’s or AH’s offer behavior in the 375-525 interval. It 
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does decrease the AH v. B dispute rate over the 375-225 interval from 90% to 50%, and the AH v. 
B dispute over all offers from 71% to 44%. All other comparisons are not statistically significant.  
Thus, the null hypothesis under H1 (of no multiple-offer effect) is rejected for B v. AL 75-225 
surplus and dispute rates in the screening game, and for the AH v. B dispute rate in the signaling 
game. 
The H2 bilateral negotiation effect can be tested by comparing results from the one-sided 
multiple-offer games and the bilateral multiple-offer game. Table 7.8 presents relevant measures 
and comparisons. When considering B’s 75-225 behavior, the ability to make counteroffers 
increases B’s mean surplus offered from 55.64 to 69.14 and increases his dispute with AL from 
4% to 17%. When considering AL’s 75-225 behavior, her mean surplus offered increases from 
56.47 to 71.64. Her dispute rate with B over that interval increases from 11% to 20%. Over the 
375-525 interval, the bilateral negotiation mechanism results in a decreased mean offer by AH, 
from 457.80 to 434. On the same interval, the dispute rate between bluffing AL and B decreases 
from 55% to 16%. The change in the dispute rate between AH and B is not statistically 
significant. It drops slightly from 44% to 39%, but the p-value is .387. 
Thus, for H2, there are two important results from comparing the one-sided multiple-
offer game to the bilateral multiple offer game. First, there is a large and significant decrease in 
the 375-525 dispute rate. Although AL bluffs, the BMO allows her to give up and accept B’s 
counteroffer, which is an opportunity she doesn’t have in the one-sided games. The second result 
is that the bilateral mechanism has no further effect on the AH v. B dispute rate beyond that 
observed under H1. 
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Table 7.8. Testing the Bilateral Offer Effect 
    Games  Tests 
Game 
Player(s) Measure 
Offer 
Interval 
 AVS 
M-O 
AVS 
BMO 
 Observed 
Difference 
Test 
Statistic p value 
Screening          
B 
Mean 
Surplus 
75-225  55.64 69.14  13.5 t = 3.24a .001 
B v. AL 
Dispute 
Rate 
All Offers  0.21 0.16  0.05 z = 1.39 .164 
B v. AL 
Dispute 
Rate 
75-225  0.04 0.17  0.13 z = 3.43 .000 
Signaling          
AL 
Mean 
Surplus 
75-225  56.47 71.64  15.17 t = 2.66b .008 
AL 
Mean 
Offer 
375-525  427.27 440.33  13.06 t = 1.44b .152 
AH 
Mean 
Offer 
375-525  457.80 434.08  23.72 t = 2.73b .007 
AL v. B 
Dispute 
Rate 
All Offers  0.24 0.18  0.06 z = 1.87 .061 
AL v. B 
Dispute 
Rate 
75-225  0.11 0.20  0.09 z = 2.12 .034 
AL v. B 
Dispute 
Rate 
375-525  0.55 0.16  0.39 z = 4.65 .000 
AH v. B 
Dispute 
Rate 
All Offers  0.44 0.39  0.05 z = 0.87 .387 
AH v. B 
Dispute 
Rate 
375-525  0.50 0.56  0.06 z = 0.67 .500 
a Difference-in-mean offer size with unequal variances. 
b Difference-in-mean offer size with equal variances. 
 
The H3 combined effect can be tested by comparing results from the one-sided single-
offer games and the bilateral multiple-offer game. Table 7.9 presents relevant measures and 
comparisons. The main findings are as follows. When B makes an offer 75-225, his mean surplus 
offered increases from 22.5 to 69.14. His dispute rate with AL decreases from 26% to 16% over 
the 75-225 interval, and from 27% to 17% over all Player B offers. When AL makes a 75-225 
offer, her mean surplus offered increases from 46.18 to 71.64. Her dispute rate against B 
increases from 9% to 20% over that interval. In the 375-525 interval bluffing AL’s mean offer 
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increases from 415.29 to 440.33. Her dispute rate against Player B decreases from 71% to 16%. 
AH’s mean offer decreases from 449.83 to 434.08 (only significant at the 10% level, p = .096). 
AH’s dispute rate against Player B decreases from 71% to 39% over all offers and from 90% to 
56% over offers 375-525. In general, the null hypothesis under H3 of no combined effect is 
generally rejected across nearly all measures. 
Table 7.9. Testing the Combined Effect 
    Games  Tests 
Game 
Player(s) Measure 
Offer 
Interval 
 AVS 
S-O 
AVS 
BMO 
 Observed 
Difference 
Test 
Statistic p value 
Screening          
B 
Mean 
Surplus 
75-225  22.5 69.14  46.64 t = 17.66a .000 
B v. AL 
Dispute 
Rate 
All Offers  0.26 0.16  0.10 z = 2.11 .034 
B v. AL 
Dispute 
Rate 
75-225  0.27 0.17  0.10 z = 1.82 .068 
Signaling          
AL 
Mean 
Surplus 
75-225  46.18 71.64  25.46 t = 4.58b .000 
AL 
Mean 
Offer 
375-525  415.29 440.33  25.04 t = 2.07b .040 
AH 
Mean 
Offer 
375-525  449.83 434.08  15.75 t = 1.67b .096 
AL v. B 
Dispute 
Rate 
All Offers  0.22 0.18  0.04 z = 1.54 .123 
AL v. B 
Dispute 
Rate 
75-225  0.09 0.20  0.11 z = 2.48 .013 
AL v. B 
Dispute 
Rate 
375-525  0.71 0.16  0.55 z = 5.08 .000 
AH v. B 
Dispute 
Rate 
All Offers  0.71 0.39  0.32 z = 2.60 .009 
AH v. B 
Dispute 
Rate 
375-525  0.90 0.56  0.34 z = 3.47 .001 
a Difference-in-mean offer size with unequal variances. 
b Difference-in-mean offer size with equal variances. 
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7.3. Conclusion 
 There are four major and three minor key takeaways from this study. The over-arching 
research hypothesis is that multiple-offer negotiation mechanisms can improve the efficiency of 
the embedded ultimatum game. The first key takeaway is that players make use of the multiple-
offer mechanism. They make two to three offers per round roughly half the time. They make 
between two and five offers about three-quarters of the time. This is true regardless of whether or 
not it is a one-sided or a bilateral game. The second key takeaway is that the dispute rate between 
AH and B decreases from 71% in the single-offer signaling game to 44% in the multiple-offer 
signaling game and 39% in the bilateral negotiation game. The effect of adding multiple offers 
appears to cause most of this effect, while the addition of the bilateral mechanism produces a 
smaller and non-statistically significant effect beyond the one-sided multiple-offer games. The 
third key takeaway is that for this decline in the AH v. B dispute rate, Player B seems to be the 
primary beneficiary. AH’s payoff decreases while B’s cost simultaneously decreases. The fourth 
key takeaway is that the ability to make multiple offers lowers the dispute rate between bluffing 
AL and B from 71% in the single-offer signaling game to 55% in the multiple-offer signaling 
game and 16% in the bilateral negotiation game. In this instance, the bilateral effect is crucial.  
Bluffing Player AL can take advantage of the opportunity to accept B’s offer and avoid the risk 
that her bluff is rejected. 
 The three minor takeaways are as follows. First, allowing for multiple offers generally 
increases the surplus that B and AL offer each other in low claim situations, to the point where 
the offers are almost equitable.  That is, the mean surplus offered by each player is nearly half of 
the surplus from settlement, compared to about 1/6th of the surplus in the one-sided single-offer 
games and about 1/3rd of the surplus in the one-sided multiple-offer games. Second, the one-
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sided multiple-offer mechanism almost eliminates excess disputes in the screening game over the 
75-225 interval, as the dispute rate decreases from 27% to 4%. However, in the bilateral 
multiple-offer mechanism this dispute rate is 17%. The third and final minor takeaway, is that 
Player AH and bluffing Player AL make the same mean offer in the 375-525 interval 
(approximately 437). Previous research (PVB 2018) noted that those players fail to pool on a 
single pooling offer in the one-sided single-offer signaling game, and in the AVS S-O and AVS 
M-O games here the AL and AH mean and median offers 375-525 also differed. 
 There are three potential extensions to this study. The first extension is a bilateral single-
offer game where each player is allowed to make (only) one offer as well as accept the offer 
made by the other player.  This could help isolate whether the critical element is the multi-offer 
nature of the game, or the bilateral nature of the game. The second extension is a turn-based or 
alternating multiple-offer mechanism where players can make multiple offers, but players must 
take alternating turns in making offers prior to acceptance by one party or the expiration of the 
timer.  These first two extensions would approximately mimic some naturally occurring 
structured bargaining mechanisms.  The third extension is to alter the length of the negotiating 
period. In this study, subjects had 30 seconds to make, evaluate, and respond to offers. A shorter 
or a longer timer could influence the results. 
In the legal bargaining world, repeated negotiation is not unusual. While there are 
situations where contracts are made on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, repeated negotiation and 
counteroffers are arguably more common, and therefore interesting to study in the laboratory. 
Such mechanisms could lead to efficiency gains by reducing the incidence of dispute, especially 
in high claim case.
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A.1. Study Information Sheet 
STUDY INFORMATION SHEET 
Study Title: An Experiment in Economic Decision Making 
Investigator 
Alexandros Vasios Sivvopoulos, MA 
Department of Economics 
5A Conner Hall 
University of Mississippi 
University, MS, 38677 
(662) 832-5856 
avasios@go.olemiss.edu 
Faculty Sponsor 
Mark Van Boening, PhD 
Department of Economics 
235 Holman Hall 
University of Mississippi 
University, MS, 38677 
(662) 915-5841 
bmvan@olemiss.edu 
 
The purpose of this study 
This is an experiment in the economics of decision making. The results of this study will help 
economists better understand the way people make decisions. 
What you will do for this study 
During this study: 
1. You'll be making a series of decisions over many rounds. These decisions will determine 
your cash payoffs. The decisions will be communicated via computer. 
2. Each round you will be matched randomly and anonymously with another participant. 
Each round you will complete the decision-making task. 
3. At the end of the study your earnings will be computed and will be paid to you privately. 
You will then exit the lab. 
Time required for this study 
This study will take approximately 60 minutes. 
Possible risks from your participation 
There are no anticipated risks to you from participating in the study. 
Benefits from your participation 
You should not expect direct benefits other than the cash incentive. However, you might 
experience satisfaction from contributing to scientific knowledge. You might enjoy the game-
like experience of the experiment. 
Incentives 
You will receive a payment for your participation. The payment will depend on the decisions you 
make during the experiment. The computer will inform you of your payment at the end of the 
experiment. A typical subject will earn $15-$25 on average. 
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A.2. Instructions for the Bilateral Multiple-Offer Game. 
Instructions for other games are similar. 
 
Instructions 
General Information 
This is a study of decision-making. If you make careful decisions, you may earn a considerable 
amount of money which will be paid to you in cash at the end of today’s experiment.  
Please put your cell phones away, do not talk to other participants, and do not look at their 
computer screens. If anyone communicates in any way other than through the provided software, 
the experiment will be terminated. 
This experiment consists of multiple decision-making “rounds”. In each round, participants will 
be randomly and anonymously paired. One player will be “Player A” and the other “Player B”. 
Participants remain the same player type throughout the experiment. Players A and B will jointly 
determine a result, which in turn determines each player’s cash earnings. Each player’s information 
and decisions are recorded by the computer. 
Earnings 
You will make decisions over numerous rounds. At the end of the experiment, the computer will 
randomly select 12 of these rounds.  Your earnings will be based on your decisions from these 12 
rounds. Different rounds will be selected for different participants. At the end of today’s 
experiment, you will be payed privately and you will sign a receipt. 
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Player A’s Earnings: At the end of each round, the computer records Player A’s payoff for the 
round. At the end of the experiment, the computer sums the payoffs from the 12 randomly selected 
rounds. This total is divided by 100, and the result is Player A’s earnings in US dollars: 
(Sum of A’s Payoffs from the 12 selected rounds) ÷ 100 = US dollar earnings 
Note that a higher payoff in a given round increases Player A’s earnings. 
Player B’s Earnings: At the end of each round, the computer records Player B’s cost for the round. 
At the end of the experiment, the computer sums the costs from the 12 randomly selected rounds. 
This sum is subtracted from a lump sum. Each Player B knows only their own lump sum. Player 
B will be told his or her lump sum at the beginning of the experiment. This difference is divided 
by 100, and the result is Player B’s earnings in US dollars: 
(Player B Lump Sum – sum of Costs from the 12 selected rounds) ÷ 100 = US dollar earnings 
Note that a higher cost in a given round decreases Player B’s earnings. 
Steps of a Round 
1. In each round, a Player A and a Player B are randomly and anonymously paired. Pairs are 
redrawn at the start of each new round. 
2. A random number between 1 and 100 is generated by the computer for each pair.  This 
number will determine an outcome L or H that applies for the round. Outcome L applies 
if the random number is less than or equal to 67. Outcome H applies if the random 
number is greater than 67. Note that outcome L has a 67% chance of occurring, and 
outcome H has a 33% chance of occurring. Only Player A knows the outcome that 
applies in each round. 
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3. After Player A is informed of the outcome, both Players can submit offers to each other. 
Offers can be made at any time and by either player. Offers update on a table on the 
screen in real time. Either player can accept an offer made by the other player. No player 
may accept their own offer. A timer is displayed in the upper right of the screen, 
informing players of the time remaining in the round. 
The following rule applies to offers: A player can only accept the most recent offer made 
by the other player. 
4. If an offer is accepted, then the round ends for that pair. Payoffs and Costs for the round 
are assigned in the following way: 
i. If Player A accepts an Offer made by Player B: 
A’s Payoff for the round = B’s Offer 
B’s Cost for the round = B’s Offer 
ii. If Player B accepts an Offer made by Player A: 
A’s Payoff for the round = A’s Offer 
B’s Cost for the round = A’s Offer 
5. If neither player accepts an offer and the time expires, both Players incur a fee of 75. Note 
that these fees apply only if no offer is accepted during the round. In this case, Player A’s 
payoff and Player B’s cost for the round depend on the outcome L or H determined in Step 
2 and the fee: 
 
iii. Outcome L: 
A’s Payoff for the round = 150 – 75 = 75 
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B’s Cost for the round = 150 + 75 = 225 
iv. Outcome H: 
A’s Payoff for the round = 450 – 75 = 375 
B’s Cost for the round = 450 + 75 = 525 
 
6. Players are informed of their payoffs and costs at the end of each round. They are also 
presented with a history of their decisions and payoffs or costs from previous rounds. 
7. After all pairs have completed the round, new random and anonymous pairings are made, 
and the next round begins. 
 
Please raise your hand if you have any questions about any of the steps or procedures in this study. 
If there are no questions, you will complete some brief instructions on your computer and begin 
the first round. 
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A.3. Player’s Record Sheet and Receipt 
Economics Research Games – Player’s Record Sheet 
 
DATE AND TIME:   _______________ 
STATION NUMBER:  MERL__________ 
PLAYER TYPE (A or B):  _______________ 
LUMP SUM (Player B Only): _______________ 
ROUNDS CHOSEN (copy from final screen when instructed): 
            
 
YOUR CASH EARNINGS IN CENTS (copy from final screen when instructed):____________ 
Notes:________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
University of Mississippi Petty Cash Payment Receipt for Economics Research Games 
 
Name (please print)             
Student ID#              
Address: Street:            
  City:               
  State:       Zip Code:       
 
Received                              dollars       
 
              
Signature of Research Participant             Date 
 
              
Signature of Investigator              Date  
110 
 
A.4.  Screenshots from the Bilateral Multiple-Offer Game. 
Screenshots of other games are similar. 
 
 
Figure A.1. Age Certification Screen 
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Figure A.2. Introductory Screen 
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Figure A.3. On-Screen Instruction Page 1 
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Figure A.4. On-Screen Instruction Page 2 
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Figure A.5. On-Screen Instruction Page 3 
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Figure A.6. On-Screen Instruction Page 4 
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Figure A.7. On-Screen Instruction Page 5 
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Figure A.8. Player Type and Outcome for the Round 
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Figure A.9. Negotiation Screen 
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Figure A.10. History Screen 
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Figure A.11. Final History and Experiment Payoff
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